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AFfER EUERTH: THE TANGIBLE EMPLOYMENT ACTION 
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT ANALYSIS 
Susan Grover* 
In this Article, Professor Grover argues that courts too readily allow employers to 
avoid vicarious liability for supervisors' unlawful sexual harassment of subordi-
nates. The Article explores the breadth of the affirmative defense first introduced in 
the Supreme Court's 1998 cases oJFaragher v. Boca Raton and Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. EHerth. That defense clears an employer of liability for a supervi-
sor's unlawful sexual harassment if (a) the employer exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) the plain-
tiff employee unreasonably Jailed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided 1Yy the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Because the de-
fense applies only if the harasser takes no tangible employment action against the 
harassed employee, the meaning ascribed to the "tangible employment action" con-
cept is pivotal. 
This Article concludes that courts often define the term too narrowly, or simply en-
gage in outcome-based analysis, allowing defendants to invoke the affirmative 
defense in cases that actually involve tangible employment actions, and thus 
should not qualify for the defense. After reviewing the history sexual harassment 
doctrine and of the rules for imputing liability to employers, Professor Grover ex-
plains the ways in which the Supreme Court's Ellerth and Faragher decisions 
resolved some questions about imputing liability for harassment, but created oth-
ers. She explores the range of meanings courts ascribe to the tangible employment 
action concept, and suggests that such a broad application of the affirmative de-
fense defeats the purpose of Title VII. 
INTRODUCTION 
With one exception/ federal employment discrimination law 
holds employers liable for their supervisors acts of 
discrimination, regardless of the employer's negligence or knowl-
edge of the discrimination.2 This general "rule of uniform 
* Director of Equal Opportunity, College of William and Mary and Associate Profes-
so r of Law at William and Mary School of Law. A.B. , Hollins College; J.D., Georgetown. The 
author has written articles on topics related to women's rights, employment discrimination 
and civil procedure have appeared in numerous publications. 
1. The exception, applicable in certain harassment cases, is the subject of this Article. 
2. Employers are thus "strictly" liable for unlawful supervisory discrimination, includ-
ing all types of harassment. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790, 807 (1998). "Strict 
liability" (also known as "absolute liability") means "[l]iability that does not depend on 
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imputation"?> derives directly from the statutory language, which 
renders employers liable for the discriminatory acts of their 
"agents."4 In most discrimination cases, supervisors are quintessen-
tially agents of the employer; a supervisor who discriminates in the 
course of taking an employment action that is his or her job to 
take, is necessarily operating as the agent of the employer.5 For this 
actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to 
make something safe . .. [a]lso termed absolute liability; liability without fault." BLAcK's LAW 
DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999). The concept of "strict" liability (liability regardless offault) 
is thus distinct from the concept of defeasible liability, which may be strict (imposed in the 
absence of fault), but which may be evaded under proper conditions. The plaintiff in a strict 
liability case bears no burden to prove the defendant's knowledge or fault, but if the liability 
is defeasible, the defendant may escape the liability by proving its own reasonableness or 
due care. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
3. This Article uses interchangeably the terms "impute liability to" and "hold vicari-
ously liable." Black's Law Dictionary defines "imputed" to mean "attributed vicariously; that 
is an act, fact, or quality is said to be 'imputed' to a person when it is ascribed or charged to 
him, not because he is personally cognizant of it or responsible for it, but because another 
person is, over whom he has control or for whose acts or knowledge he responsible." 
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 758 (6th ed. 1990). The Article refers to the courts' standard 
practice of holding employers vicariously liable for supervisors' acts of discrimination as the 
"rule of uniform imputation." 
4. This Article focuses on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act because that is the fed-
eral law forbidding workplace discrimination based on sex, including sexual harassment at 
work. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (defining "unlawful employment practices" as discrimination 
based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"). Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 provides: 
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce 
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more 
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a 
person ... 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b). 
Other federal laws, such as those prohibiting age and disability discrimination, similarly 
impose liability on employers for the discriminatory acts of their supervisors. See Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, 629 (defining "employer" to 
include any agent of an employer); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 
12101 , 12111 (defining "employer" to include agents of employers) . The law does not gen-
erally impose liability on the supervisors themselves. See, e.g., Lenhardt v. Basic lnst. of Tech., 
Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1995) (describing the recent trend away from holding 
individual managers liable under Title VII) ; Sauers v. Salt Lake City, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (lOth 
Cir. 1993) (Title VII relief is against employer, not against individual employees whose acts 
create liability) quoting Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991 ); see also 
SoLOTOFF & KRAMER, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORK PLACE 
§ 2.02[1] (2000) (noting recent decisions that have rejected individual supervisor liability 
under Title VII). 
5. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) provides what the Supreme 
Court has described as "a central principle of agency law: 'A master is subject to liability for 
the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.'" See 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755-56 (1998) (quoting REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 219(1)) . Compare this with the rule for assessing employer respon-
sibility for punitive damages. In the latter inquiry, employers who lack knowledge of their 
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reason, most discrimination cases have yielded little discussion of 
the rule of uniform imputation. The single exception to the rule, 
by contrast, has received substantial attention since its introduction 
in 1998. That exception arises in certain cases involving sexual or 
other discriminatory workplace harassment.6 As with "mainstream" 
(non-harassment) discrimination cases, the law imputes liability to 
employers for all actionable supervisor harassment, without regard 
to employer knowledge or negligence. Unlike employers charged 
with mainstream discrimination, however, employers charged with 
harassment enjoy the possibility of an escape route in some cases. 
The potential escape route is an affirmative defense, and it is avail-
able in those cases in which the harassment involves no tangible 
employment action against the victim. 7 Because the potential for 
employers to escape application of the rule of uniform imputation 
exists only in harassment cases that involve no tangible employ-
ment action, it matters a great deal what definition courts give to 
the term: "tangible employment action." This Article explores the 
evolving definition of that concept. 
Part I of the Article sets forth the history of pertinent sexual 
harassment doctrine and of the rules for imputing liability to em-
ployers. Part II explains the ways in which Supreme Court 
decisions have resolved some questions about imputing liability for 
harassment, but created others. It looks at the birth of the tangible 
employment action concept as a bright line test for determining 
which imputation analysis applies to a given harassment case. In 
Part III, the Article explores the range of meanings courts ascribe 
to the tangible employment action concept. The Article concludes 
that courts often define the term too narrowly, allowing defendants 
to invoke the affirmative defense in cases that actually involve tan-
gible employment actions, and thus should not qualify for the 
defense. 
supervisors' culpable behavior may be able to avert the imposition of punitive damages. 
Kolstad v. American Dental Association allows a good faith defense. 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999). 
6. This Article focuses on sexual harassment, but harassment may be actionable when 
motivated by some other protected trait, such as race or religion. See, e.g., Cerros v. Steel 
Techs., Inc., 288 F.3d 1040, 1047 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that severe or pervasive verbal racial 
and religious harassment actionable under Title VII). 
7. Because individual supervisors are not personally liable under Title VII, victims of 
unlawful sexual harassment who fail to recover from the employer, effectively have a legal 
right with no remedy. Plaintiffs who lose Title VII's protections in this manner, however, may 
recover under state law. In fact, some state laws provide broader remedies than those avail-
able under Title VII. See, e.g., Laughinghouse v. Risser, 786 F. Supp. 920 (D. Kan. 1992) 
(stating that state law permits recovery against both supervisor and employer). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Title VII prohibits sex discrimination in employment.8 Sex dis-
crimination occurs when supervisors base employment decisions, 
such as hiring and promotion, on considerations of an employee's 
sex, rather than or in additional to such legitimate considerations 
as the employee's qualifications and performance record.9 Sex dis-
crimination also occurs when a supervisor engages in sexual 
harassment that alters the terms, conditions, or privileges of a sub-
ordinate's employment.10 Actionable sexual harassment may take 
any of a variety of forms. Workplace taunts and insults that are mo-
tivated by the victim's sex may give rise to sexual harassment 
discrimination claims, as may sexual demands and suggestions.11 
Sometimes actionable harassment culminates in the harasser's tak-
ing adverse job action against the victim, and sometimes it does 
12 
not. 
The latter category-claims involving environmental harass-
ment that does not include adverse employment action against 
the victim-first received Supreme Court recognition in the 1986 
case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 13 At issue in that case was 
whether Mechele Vinson could win her Title VII harassment case, 
even though the harassing supervisor had not taken adverse 
job action against her. 14 The Court concluded that she 
8. The other categories of discrimination forbidden by Title VII are race, religion, 
color and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
9. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (2) . If there are several motives for an employment decision, 
some discriminatory and some not, the employer is nevertheless found liable, though proof 
of the nondiscriminatory reasons reduces the remedy, excluding money damages and cer-
tain types ofinjunctions. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
10. Workplace sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, which prohibits discrimination in employment based on race, sex, color, religion, and 
national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 
17 ( 1993) (explaining elements of hostile environmental sexual harassment claim); Meritor 
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (recognizing claims for hostile environment and 
quid pro quo sexual harassment). Sexual harassment violates the proscription of sex dis-
crimination only if the harassment is motivated by the victim's sex. Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
11. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80. 
12. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (scope of actionable harassment 
not limited to economically measurable harm). 
13. 477 U .S. 57 (1986) . 
14. /d. at 64. By the time of Meritor, it had already been well-established that cases in 
which supervisors barter sexual favors for job advantages violate Title VII. See id. at 68 ("'It is 
without question that sexual harassment of female employees in which they are asked or 
required to submit to sexual demands as a condition to obtain empluyment or to maintain emplay-
ment or to obtain promotions falls within protection of Title VII." ') (emphasis in original) 
(quoting lower court, Vinson v. Taylor, No. 78-1793, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10676, at *23 
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could. ,r. The Meritor Court distinguished between "quid pro quo" 
harassment cases, in which a supervisor threatens to take job-
related action against the victim, and environmental cases like 
Vinson's, in which the environment alone gives rise to the claim.16 
The court suggested that both types of harassment could give rise 
to claims, but that the rules for imputing liability to employers 
might be different for the two.17 For purposes of imputing liability 
to the employer, quid pro quo harassment had always been treated 
like any other employment discrimination: subject to the rule of 
uniform imputation.18 With the recognition of environmental har-
assment, the Meritor Court called for rethinking of the rule's 
uniformity. By definition, the new environmental claims lacked 
precisely the ingredient that had assured the existence of the 
agency relationship in quid pro quo cases: the supervisor's dis-
criminatory use of delegated power to take or threaten 19 action 
against the plaintiff that it was within the supervisor's job descrip-
tion to take. Because that guarantee of an agency relationship was 
absent from environmental harassment, the Meritor Court envi-
sioned situations in which supervisors would engage in such 
harassment without the aid of delegated authority. For this reason, 
(D.D.C. Feb 26, 1980)). Interestingly, the facts of Vinson's case probably involved economic 
harm. The discriminatory harassment at issue arguably led to Vinson's consuuctive dis-
charge. The MeritorCourt's decision did not address that issue. 
15. Courts accepted the quid pro quo theory of harassment more readily and earlier 
than they accepted the hostile environment cause of action. See Glenn George, Empfqyer 
Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Buck Stops l11u>re134 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 3-5 & nn.13-
23 (discussing courts' ready acceptance of quid pro quo sexual harassment cause of action 
under Title VII and hesitance to recognize the hostile environment cause of action). The 
courts' ultimate acceptance of sexually hostile environment claims was predicated on their 
well-established acceptance of racially hostile environment claims. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
786 (citing race and national-origin cases upon which the Meritor Court predicated recogni-
tion of environmental sexual harassment claim). 
16. 477 U.S at 68. 
17. !d. 
18. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790 (relying on Meritor, 477 U.S at 70-71, for the proposi-
tion that discrimination with tangible results has always resulted in employer liability 
regardless of employer knowledge or negligence); Burlington lndust., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742, 753 (1998) (noting "equivalence of quid pro quo label and vicarious liability"). 
19. Prior to 1998, courts disagreed on whether the rule of uniform imputation applied 
to quid pro quo cases in which the supervisor did not carry out the threat. Some lower 
courts recognized as quid pro quo only those cases in which the supervisor actually followed 
through and took the threatened action against the harassment victim. See, e.g., Bryson v. 
Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 1996), Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908-09 
(11th Cir. 1982) . Other courts applied the rule of uniform imputation even where the threat 
was unactuated. See, e.g., Reinhold v. Virginia, 135 F.3d 920, 933 n.3 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated 
for reconsideration in light of Ellerth and Faragher, 135 F.3d 920 (1998) (discussing pre-Ellerth 
court decisions holding that threats suffice to state a quid pro quo claim, despite the ab-
sence of action taken on the threats); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
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the Court directed lower courts to use the principles of agency law 
to derive appropriate standards for environmental harassment 
cases. 
20 In the wake of Meritor21 the lower courts generally held em-
ployers liable for supervisors' harassment of subordinates in 
accordance with the following schema: 
PosT- MERITOR 
TYPE OF CLAIM Qum PRO Quo HOSTILE 
ENVIRONMENT 
Facts Typically Giving Rise to Harasser threatens or takes Sexual harassment is severe 
Claim: employment action against or pervasive enough to 
(or in favor of) a subordinate create an abusive work 
employee22 in exchange for environment, thereby altering 
sexual favors. the terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment. 
Standard for Holding Employer is liable for all acts Courts (charged by Meritor 
Employer Liable for Acts of of supervisor, without regard Court to) apply agency 
Supervisor: to employer knowledge, principals to the facts of the 
negligence, response to case in order to determine 
harassment or attempt to whether such principals 
guard against harassment. warrant vicarious liability on 
the particular facts of the 
case. 
In response to Meritor's command to devise an analysis appropri-
ate to environmental cases, the lower courts produced such a 
disarray of approaches that the Supreme Court accepted certiorari 
in two appellate court decisions to resolve the circuit split on the 
20. 477 U.S. at 63. Increasingly, it is clear that the only possible liability under Title VII 
is that of the employer, and that individual supervisors who engage in discriminatory acts are 
not liable in their individual capacity. See supra note 3. This means that limitations on the 
scope of employer vicarious liability for discrimination effectively limit the scope of Title VII 
itself. 
21. Between the 1986 decision in Meritor and the 1998 Ellerth and Faragher decisions, 
the Court twice elaborated on the elements of the hostile environment cause of action itself. 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 
U.S. 17 (1993) . Most importantly, the Harris Court held that the plaintiff in a hostile envi-
ronment case need not prove psychological injury to establish harassment. 510 U.S. at 22. 
22. Courts have sometimes defined "quid pro quo" to include cases in which a supervi-
sor tries to bargain with a subordinate to exchange employment benefit or detriment for 
sexual favors or refusals, even though no tangible employment action ("TEA") against the 
subordinate ensues. See Reinhold 35 F.3d at 933 n .3 (discussing pre-Ellerth court decisions 
holding that threats suffice to state a quid pro quo claim, despite the absence of action 
taken on the threats). On the other hand, TEA's, as defined by the Supreme Court, may 
involve employment actions taken against the subordinate that are part and parcel of the 
harassment, even though they are not in retaliation for the subordinate's failure to submit to 
sexual overtures. 
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imputation issue. The two cases were Faragher v. Boca Raton25 and 
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth. 24 
II. BETH ANN FARAGHER AND KIMBERLY ELLERTH 
Beth Ann Faragher and Kimberly Ellerth both claimed that their 
former employers should be held liable for their supervisors' sex-
ual harassment.25 Faragher's was inarguably a hostile environment 
case, calling upon the Court to elucidate the employer liability 
standard envisaged in Meritor. 26 Ellerth, by contrast, characterized 
her case as quid pro quo. 27 Ellerth 's supervisor threatened to retali-
ate for Ellerth's refusal to submit to his sexual demands, but had 
never carried out the threats.28 Ellerth apparently hoped that the 
threats themselves would qualify her case for the traditional quid 
pro quo rule of uniform imputation, without resort to the agency 
analysis that Meritor prescribed for environmental cases. Unfortu-
nately for Ellerth, the Court realigned the boundaries between 
types of harassment, positing that it was not the threats but the ac-
tuality of employment action that rendered a harassment case 
subject to the traditional rule of uniform imputation. The Court 
placed unfulfilled threats on the environmental side of the em-
ployer liability divide, ultimately opening the possibility that 
Ellerth's employer might avoid liability for the harassment.29 
A. Kimberly Ellerth s Case 
Kimberly Ellerth's harasser was Ted Slowik, her supervisor's su-
pervisor.30 According to Ellerth, Slowik sexually harassed her by 
making remarks about her physique and conditioning approval of 
client-based requests on her willingness to wear more revealing 
clothing.31 When Ellerth resisted Slowik's advances, Slowik warned 
her, "[Y] ou know, Kim, I could make your life very hard or very 
23. 524 u.s. 775 (1998). 
24. 524 u.s. 742 (1998). 
25. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 746. 
26. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791-92. 
27. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 749, 753, 765. 
28. /d. at 747-48. 
29. /d. at 754. 
30. ld. at 747. 
31. !d. at 748. 
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easy at Burlington."32 Ellerth complained directly to Slowik, but did 
not complain to anyone else during the fourteen months that 
Slowik harassed her.33 Although Ellerth knew that the company had 
an anti-harassment policy, she also knew that the policy required 
her to report the harassment to her immediate supervisor, who was 
required to report to the next higher supervisor, who was Ted 
Slowik himsel(w Ultimately, Ellerth resigned her position, initially 
asserting reasons for leaving the company that were unrelated to 
the harassment.35 Three weeks later, however, she sent a letter to 
explain that her real reason for leaving was in fact the harass-
ment.36 That letter was the first time she complained to anyone at 
the company other than Slowik. 37 
Given the Meritor analytical paradigm, it was no wonder that 
Ellerth couched her complaint in terms of quid pro quo harass-
ment: threats had been made. The problem with Ellerth's lawsuit 
was that Slowik never followed through on the threats when Ellerth 
rejected his sexual advances.38 The case was one of quid pro quo 
only in the sense that Slowik consistently told Ellerth that she 
would experience tangible job effects depending on how she re-
sponded to his requests. It was not a quid pro quo case, however, 
inasmuch as Slowik never took the threatened or promised ac-
tions.39 Because Slowik did not take employment actions against 
Ellerth, the Supreme Court characterized her case as environ-
mental and used the occasion, along with the Faragher case, to 
revisit more specifically the imputation issues raised by Meritor.40 
32. I d. 
on 
.:>.:>. ld. at 748-49. 
34. ld. at 748. 
35. I d. 
36. I d. 
37. ld. at 748-49. 
38. The only exception to this was the occasion when he refused to help her on the 
telephone with a customer matter because she refused to tell him what she was wearing at 
the time. ld. at 748. 
39. In fact, Ellerth ·was actually promoted during her time with the company, despite 
her refusal to submit to Slowik's demands. ld. at 748. 
40. The Supreme Court did n o t explain what would happen where the target averted 
TEA by succumbing to sexual demands. The EEOC guidelines provided that such cases 
should be subjec t to the rule of uniform imputation. EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Vicari-
ous Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (june 18, 1999) available at 
http:/ / www.eeoc.gov. 
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B. Beth Ann Faragher's Case 
Beth Ann Faragher's case was simpler. During her college years, 
Beth Ann Faragher worked part time and during summers as a 
lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton, Florida.41 Mter she resigned 
her position, Faragher sued the City, claiming that two of her im-
mediate supervisors, Bill Terry and David Silverman, had "created a 
'sexually hostile atmosphere' at the beach."42 Faragher's complaint 
involved ongoing '"uninvited and offensive touching,' ... lewd re-
marks; and . . . speaking of women in offensive terms. "43 She 
alleged that Terry, Chief of the Marine Safety Division that em-
ployed Faragher, "repeatedly touched the bodies of female 
employees without invitation, . . . put his arm around Faragher, 
with his hand on her buttocks, and once made contact with an-
other female lifeguard in a motion of sexual simulation. He made 
crudely demeaning references to women generally, and once 
commented disparagingly on Faragher's shape."44 He allegedly told 
a female job applicant that "female lifeguards had sex with their 
male counterparts and asked whether she would do the same."45 
Similarly, Silverman "once tackled Faragher and remarked that, 
but for a physical characteristic he found unattractive, he would 
readily have had sexual relations with her."46 Silverman also "pan-
tomimed an act of oral sex . . . [ w] ithin earshot of the female 
lifeguards, . . . made frequent, vulgar references to women and 
sexual matters, commented on [women's bodies], and ... told fe-
male lifeguards that he would like to engage in sex with them."47 
A bench trial yielded a victory for Faragher. 48 The trial court 
concluded that Faragher's supervisors' sexual harassment of 
41. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. 
42. /d. 
43. /d. Faragher's complaint alleged "that Terry once said that he would never pro-
mote a woman to the rank of lieutenant, and that Silverman had said to Faragher, 'Date me 
or clean the toilets for a year.'" /d. In addition to the Title VII claim, Faragher's complaint 
included claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law. /d. 
44. /d. at 782 (citations omitted). 
45. /d. 
46. /d. 
47. /d. (citations omitted). 
48. /d. at 783. The judges at all levels were generally in agreement that the harassers 
were Faragher's supervisors and that the facts of Faragher's case established the elements of 
a hostile environment case, so the only question was whether liability should be imputed to 
the employer. 
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Faragher violated Title VII. 49 The trial court also concluded that 
agency principles required imputation of the harassment to the 
employer, as did the employer's "'knowledge, or constructive 
knowledge."'50 The Eleventh Circuit reversed.51 Although it agreed 
that the supervisors had engaged in unlawful harassment, it con-
cluded that agency principles did not warrant imputation of the 
harassment to the employer.52 The Supreme Court, in turn, dis-
agreed with the Eleventh Circuit and ordered reinstatement of the 
judgment for plaintiff. 53 
C. The Rule of Faragher and Ellerth 
Faragher and Ellerth did two things: first, they realigned the 
boundary between harassment cases subject to the rule of uniform 
imputation and those in which employers might avoid liability; and 
second, they devised a new analytic framework for determining 
when, in the latter group, such avoidance would be possible. As to 
the boundary realignment, the Court exempted cases such as 
Ellerth's, in which threats were made but not carried out, from the 
rule of uniform imputation. The crucial demarcation, the 
Faragher/Ellerth Court said, is hot that suggested by Meritor between 
quid pro quo cases (involving sexual demands) and environmental 
cases; rather, it is between cases in which the harasser actually takes 
a tangible employment action (hereinafter "TEA"54) against the 
victim, regardless of whether sexual demands are made, and cases 
in which the supervisor takes no TEA, even though threats may 
have been made. 55 If the harassment involves a TEA, the Court ex-
49. /d. Specifically, the trial court concluded that the supervisors engaged in "dis-
criminatory harassment sufficiently serious to alter the conditions of Faragher's employment 
and constitute an abusive working environment." /d. at 783. 
50. /d. (quoting trial court, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1!:194)). 
51. /d. at 78~4. 
52. /d. at 784. The appellate panel acknowledged that "the existence of the agency re-
lationship" always aids a supervisor to accomplish hostile environment sexual harassment 
"because his responsibilities include dose proximity to and regular contact with the victim," 
but concluded that traditional agency law does not employ so broad a concept of aid as a 
predicate to employer liability, requiring something more that a mere combination of 
agency relationship and improper conduct by the agent. /d. at 785. 
53. /d. at 808. 
54. Courts tha t continue to use the "quid pro quo" language in the post-Ellerth era may 
create confusion because it is not clear whether the term refers to all cases involving threats 
or bargains (as some courts read the language to mean in Meritor) or only tangible employ-
ment action cases. 
55. The Court purported to base the new analysis on the prong of agency law that 
renders principals liable when the existence of the agency relationship aids their servants in 
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plained, the case qualifies for the traditional rule of uniform impu-
tation.56 Thus, it was not the presence of sexual demands that 
qualified a case for the uniform imputation rule, but the presence 
of concrete job action against the victim. 
The Faragher/Ellerth Court went on to sketch a new analytic 
method to guide lower court determinations of whether to impute 
liability to employers in non-TEA (hereinafter "environmental" or 
"hostile environment") cases.57 This analysis renders the employer 
presumptively liable both for supervisors' TEA action harassment 
and for supervisors' hostile environment harassment. However, 
whereas the employer has no opportunity to rebut the presump-
tion in TEA cases, the employer in environmental cases has an 
opportunity to avoid vicarious liability if it can prove both elements 
of an affirmative defense. 58 In the words of the Faragher Court: 
the commission of wrongful acts. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789. But see Michael Harper, Empluyer 
Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN 
DIEGO L. REv. 41, 55-56 (1999) (arguing that the "Faragher·Ellerth formulation was not com-
pelled by common law agency principles"). Ellerth/Faragher effectively established a 
presumption that supervisors who harass, whether environmentally or by taking more for-
mal action against the subordinate, are necessarily aided by the agency relationship. The 
Court's injection of the affirmative defense reflected the Court's belief that the agency rela-
tionship necessarily aids the harassment in TEA cases, but not of necessity in environmental 
cases. The suggestion that the Court relied on agency law is belied by the Court's election of 
the demarcation between TEA and other cases, because quid pro quo cases not resulting in 
a TEA are certainly empowered by the agency relationship as well. 
56. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789. The Faragher Court acknowledged the unanimity with 
which courts had accepted the rule that employers cannot avoid vicarious liability for sexual 
or racial harassment that involves supervisors' employment actions with tangible results, 
such as hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, and work assignment. /d. Even in the ab-
sence of a TEA, the Court noted, the employer cannot avoid vicarious liability if the 
employer or high-echelon officials actually know of the harassment. 
57. Despite the Meritor mandate to predicate such analysis on agency law, the 
Faragher/Ellerth Court ultimately created a structure that turned more on negligence princi-
ples than on agency law. Agency law focuses generally on the relationship between the 
principal and its agent, whereas the Faragher/Ellerth framework focuses ultimately on consid-
erations of reasonableness. In fact the Court perceived its prescribed analytic framework as a 
compromise between the principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of super-
visory authority and "Title VII's . . . policies of encouraging forethought by employers and 
saving action by objecting employees." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
58. By making these issues part of an affirmative defense, rather than elements of 
plaintiffs claim, the Court placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant. This proce-
dural shift of the burden of is crucial because, in theory, the plaintiff has now won the case 
unless the employer proves the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. But see Cheryl L. 
Anderson, Thinking Within the Box: How Proof Models Are Used To Limit The Scope OJ Sexual 
Harassment Law 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. LJ. 125, 134 (2001) (suggesting employer is liable 
only if it fails on both prongs of the affirmative defense, where both defendant is negligent 
and the plaintiff is ·not negligent). In fact, either the defendant's negligence or the plain-
tiffs reasonable care destroys the affirmative defense. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (using 
conjunctive, rather than disjunctive, in describing the elements of the affirmative defense: 
"defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care 
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff 
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[A]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized 
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a 
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority 
over the employee. When no [TEA] is taken, a defending 
employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or dam-
ages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the 
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of 
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 59 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportuni-
ties provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise" (emphasis added)). 
In the wake of Ellerlh and Faragher, a few courts suggested that those decisions had broad-
ened the definition of "supervisor" from what it had been in prior case law. See Stephanie 
Ann Henning Blackman, The Faragher and Ellerth Problem: Luwer Courts' Confusion &garding 
the Definition of "Supervisor," 54 VAND. L. REv. 123, 152 n.230 (citing cases). Cases prior to 
Ellerth and Faragher defined "supervisor" to mean someone with the power to hire, fire or 
otherwise set the conditions of employment. /d. at 125. In Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme 
Court defined "supervisor" as someone with "immediate (or successively higher) authority 
over the employee." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. There is no necessary 
difference between these two definitions, inasmuch as "authority" over the subordinate 
connotes power to affect terms of employment. Given that the power to assign work is and 
always has been an indicium of supervisory status, the pre- and post-Ellerth/Faragher defini-
tions are consistent. The power to hire or fire is a sign of supervisory status, but so is the 
power to assign work, which is clearly a condition of employment. See Paroline v. Unisys 
Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989). 
59. 524 U.S. at 807 (citations omitted). On this prong of the affirmative defense, the 
Court noted that plaintiff's unreasonable failure to make use of an employer-provided com-
plaint procedure would usually be a sufficient showing but not the only way for defendants 
to meet this element of the defense. /d. at 807-08. As things have evolved after Ellerth and 
Faragher, however, many courts have granted summary judgments to defendants based solely 
on the defendant's meeting the first element of the defense, even though the plaintiff's 
timely use of defendant's procedures made it impossible for the defendant to meet the sec-
ond element. See, e.g., Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., No. 00-1604, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3517 
(4th Cir. Mar. 8, 2001); David Sherwyn et al., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your "1-
800" Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the FUzws in the Affirmative 
Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1265 (2001). But see johnson v. 
West, 218 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2000) (requiring that defendant meet both prongs of the 
defense). Interestingly, the Ellerth/Faragher Court seemed ambivalent about whether the 
affirmative defense would forestall liability entirely, or whether it would have the lesser im-
pact that affirmative defenses have sometimes recently had in the employment 
discrimination context: cutting off monetary damages, but still allowing the plaintiff to re-
cover attorney's fees. The EEOC guidelines reflect this uncertainty. They provide: "When 
harassment by a supervisor creates an unlawful hostile environment but does not result in a 
[TEA], the employer can raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, which it must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence." EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Em-
ployer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (June 18, 1999), available at 
http:/ /www.eeoc.gov. 
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Thus, absent the supervisor's taking a TEA against the victim, the 
employer may avert vicarious liability if it proves, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, its own reasonable care and the victim's lack 
thereof. 60 
In Faragher's case, the Supreme Court concluded that the City 
of Boca Raton could not prevail on the affirmative defense.61 The 
City's sexual harassment policy and procedures had already been 
found as a factual matter to be utterly ineffective. 52 In fact, the trial 
court had found a complete failure on the part of the City to dis-
seminate its policy among lifeguards employed by the City.63 The 
Court remanded Ellerth's case, by contrast, to allow Burlington 
Industries an opportunity to assert and prove the newly available 
affirmative defense.64 
The categories65 of harassment after Ellerth and Faragher, and the 
concomitant standards for imputing liability to the employer are: 
60. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 80&-07. The Court cautioned that employers would not always 
need to prove the existence of harassment policies and complaint procedures, and that the 
existence of such a policy would not invariably excuse the employer. /d. at 807. 
61 . /d. at 808-09. 
62. /d. 
63. !d. at 808 (quoting trial court, Fraghaer v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 
1560 (S.D. Fla. 1994)). 
64. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766. 
65. I include quid pro quo claims absent TEA with environmental claims under the as-
sumption that the supervisor's proposal to base employment decisions on the victim's 
complicity in sexual demands necessarily constitutes an instance severe enough to be ac-
tionable as hostile environment harassment. See Steven H . Aden, "Harm in Asking": A Reply to 
Eugene Scalia and an Analysis of the Paradigm Shift in the Supreme Courts Title VII Sexual Harass-
ment jurisprudence, 8 TEMP. PoL. & Crv. RTs. L. REv. 477, 498-499 (1999) (describing harm 
that accrues from threatS to condition employment decisions on victim's engaging in sex 
even without actuation of threatened event). But see jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 676 
(E.D. Ark. 1998) (finding no hostile work environment) . 
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PosT-EILERTH 
TYPE OF CLAIM TEA HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT 
Facts Typically Giving Rise Superviso,.OO hires, fires, Supervisor engages in 
to Claim otherwise takes direct harassment so severe or 
(often economic) action pervasive68 that it creates an 
against the victim in abusive working environment and 
connection with alters the terms, conditions or 
harassment, including privileges of the victim's 
fulfilling quid pro quo employment69 -including 
threats.67 unfulfilled threats. 
Standard for Holding Employer is liable without a Employer is liable without a 
Employer Liable for Acts of showing of negligence for showing of negligence for 
Supervisor supervisor harassment; no supervisor harassment, but 
affirmative defense affirmative defense is available. 
available (i.e., rule of 
uniform imputation). 
Courts' analysis of vicarious liability for supervisor harassment now 
should proceed in accordance with the following flow chart: 
66. Only supervisors are capable of TEA's. It has sometimes been argued that supervi-
sors should be defined as those who are empowered to take TEA against their subordinates, 
and that the term should not encompass those whose supervisory powers are of a Jesser 
scale. See Blackman, supra note 58. 
67. It is not clear what the standard is for the supervisor's rewarding an employee who 
submits to the sexual demands. It is also not clear what the standard for employer liability is 
for the constructive discharge of the employee. Ellerth, who allegedly resigned her position 
because of the harassment, would probably have been a candidate for a constructive dis-
charge claim if she had alleged that the harassment made conditions so intolerable that she 
had no choice but to leave. She did not allege precisely that, however; so when the Ellerth 
Court states that "EIIerth has not alleged she suffered a tangible employment action at the 
hands of Slowik," the Court is not precluding the possibility that she might have done so. See 
524 U.S. at 766. 
68. Arguably, the harasser's status as a supervisor means that a threat of retaliation for 
failure to submit to a sexual advance is by definition severe. 
69. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67). Even though unfulfilled 
threats of retaliation for refusal to submit to advances can no longer invoke the rule of uni-
form imputation, the presence of such threats should be sufficient to establish that the 
environmental harassment is severe. The supervisor's deliberate use of delegated authority 
to attempt to extract sex from a subordinate employee goes to the heart of the sort of dis-
criminatory use of authority that Title VII prohibits. 
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FLOW CHART70 
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISOR'S HARASSMENT 
WHEN Is THE EMPLOYER VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR SUPERVISORS'7' 
HARASSMENT OF SUBORDINATE EMPLOYEES? 
Did Harassing Supervisor 
take a 
tangible employment action 
against the target? 
I 1 
If yes, If no, 
employer liable has plaintiff pleaded/proved 
no defense that supervisor created an 
actionable hostile environment? 
I 
I 
If yes, If no, 
employer liable but may invoke employer is 
affirmative defense, and will prevail if not liable for supervisor 
proves both prongs of defense harassment under Title VII 
I 
Has defendant 
pleaded/proved that 
( 1) defendant responded adequately, and 
(2) that the plaintiff failed to avoid hann? 
If yes, If no, 
employer employer is 
averts liable for 
liability supervisor harassment 
In the wake of Ellerth/Faragher, characterizing a sexual harass-
ment case as TEA is usually dispositive.72 Theoretically, of course, a 
70. Judge Tom Stagg, Senior District judge of the Western District of Louisiana, pos-
ited a similar flow-chart or "roadmap," which was included as an appendix to the Fifth 
Circuit opinion in Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 288 (5th Cir. 2000). The Casiano 
schema has the disadvantage of suggesting that the only harassment TEA's that fall under 
the rule of uniform imputation are those in which the supervisor takes the action against the 
employee because of how the employee responded to the harassment. See id. at 285; compare 
id. with Vicki Schultz, &conceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE LJ. 1683, 1689 (1998) 
(arguing that courts erroneously exclude from coverage nonsexualized sexual harassment). 
In fact, the Casiano chart even expressly limits the TEA category to quid pro quo cases with-
out mention of those TEA cases that are not quid pro quo but simply environmental 
harassment culminating in the TEA. 213 F. 3d at 288. 
71. Courts disagree on the issue of who is a supervisor for these purposes. See Black-
man, supra note 58, at 125 (discussing disagreement). 
72. See, e.g., Casiano, 213 F.3d 278. The ramifications of the Ellerth/Faragher decisions 
extend beyond harassment doctrine. Courts and commentators have suggested that the 
affirmative defenses should be made available in retaliation and other non-harassment. See, 
e.g., Linda M. Glover, Title VII section 704(a) Retaliation Claims: Turning a Blind Eye Toward 
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finding that harassment encompassed no TEA against the plaintiff 
simply permits the employer to invoke the defense, but indicates 
nothing about whether the employer will meet its burden of per-
suasion on both elements. In practice, however, decisional law 
since Ellerth and Faragher demonstrates that defendants permitted 
to invoke the defense generally win their cases. Two studies of har-
assment cases decided after the Ellerth/Faragher decisions reveal an 
overwhelming tendency for employers to win on the affirmative 
defense.73 The studies looked at opinions on summary judgment 
motions in which employers "argued that a hostile-environment 
case should be dismissed because the employer satisfied, as a mat-
ter of law, the affirmative defense."74 The studies' results suggest 
that courts operate under an unspoken presumption in favor of 
defendants on the affirmative defense, rather than against them as 
the burden of persuasion requires. The researchers concluded that 
many of the judicial opinions on the affirmative defense were re-
sult oriented. "[T]o reward an employer who responds adequately 
to a harassment complaint, courts often find that the complaining 
employee acted 'unreasonably' as a matter of law, even when such 
a determination may merit a more thorough review of the facts of 
the case."75 Plaintiffs who lose on the TEA issue, thus, generally lose 
their cases. 
Ill. PROBLEMS IN DEFINITION 
Despite arguments favoring a broad definition for the TEA con-
cept, courts often err on the side of finding environmental 
harassment.76 Because this mischaracterization allows defendants to 
Justice, 38 Hous. L. REv. 577, 581 n.21 (2001) (arguing that Ellerth affirmative defense 
should be available in retaliatory harassment cases brought under section 704 of Title VII). 
73. See Shernyn, supra note 59, at 1288 (study results indicate that employers prevail 
regardless of whether plaintiffs exercised reasonable care; employers won in a majority of 
cases in which defendants invoked affirmative defense on summary judgment); see aLmAnn 
Juliano & Stewart]. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CoRNELL L. REv. 548, 
592 (2001) (study finds that employers with harassment policies in place general avoid liabil-
ity). 
74. See Sherwyn, supra note 59, at 1268-69. 
75. !d. Compare id., with Harper, supra note 55, at 46 (predicting that "placement of the 
burden of proof' on the defendant might prove "critical to the outcome of a case in which 
the trier of fact is uncertain about" either party's reasonableness), and Harper, supra note 55, 
at 48 (" Faragher-Ellerth approach clarifies that when both the employer and the employee 
victim have acted reasonably, the costs of the discriminatory harassment are to be imposed 
on the employer."). 
76. There is no bright line between TEA and environmental cases, but rather a con-
tinuum. Cf Susan Estrich, Sex at Warit, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 834 (1991) (suggesting that the 
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invoke the affirmative defense, the ramifications are serious. 
Courts' readiness to conclude that there has been no TEA results 
at best in excessive litigation on the affirmative defense issues, and 
at worst (and quite frequently") in injustice for employees who are 
victims of TEA's but whose employers escape liability entirely un-
der an affirmative defense not intended for such cases. 
A major cause of the under-identification of TEA cases is courts' 
parsimonious definition of the TEA concept itself. 78 Some courts 
import constrictive doctrinal developments from other areas of 
Title VII, even where those developments do not logically fit the 
harassment context.79 Other courts have relied on excerpts of the 
Ellerth/Faragher text taken out of context to define TEA more nar-
rowly than the Ellerth/Faragher rationales in total would suggest.80 
Disagreement on the issue is understandable because the 
Ellerth/Faragher Court articulated a TEA standard that is inconsis-
tent with the Court's underlying rationale, which itself contains 
internal inconsistencies.81 The Ellerth/Faragher rationale, moreover, 
bespeaks a definition much broader than that suggested by some 
of the examples the Court cites.82 Building on, or in tandem with, 
distinction between quid pro quo and environmental harassment "takes the form of a con-
tinuum rather than a divide"). 
77. See Shenvyn, supra note 59, at 1285--86 (documenting courts' frequent finding that 
defendants have prevailed on the Ellerth defense, even where defendants fail to make any 
showing at all on the second prong of the defense). 
78. Deficiencies in factual analysis may entail disaggregation. Courts treat situations 
that in the aggregate , amount to TEA harassment (usually constructive discharge) as a series 
of isolated occurrences, which appear trivial when viewed separately. SeeM. Isabel Medina A 
Matter Of Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL REV. L. & WOMEN's 
STUD. 311, 341 (1999) (arguing that courts' disaggregation of claims and conduct results in 
courts' seldom finding instances of hostility sufficient to support actionable hostile envi-
ronment claims). See, e.g., Watkins v. Prort Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 29841 , at *13 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000) (finding no 
connection between harassment and plaintiff's termination despite causal relationship be-
tween two). Hostile environment sexual harassment analysis is similarly fraught with such 
"disaggregation." 
79. See Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc. 200 F.3d 507, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1999) (relying on 
pre-Ellerth material adversity requirement to give content to Ellerth TEA standard) . 
80. See Harper, supra note 55, a t 64. 
81. See id. at 49 ("[T]he Court's use of common law agency principles was too formu-
laic, and its invocation of Title VII policy and precedent was too truncated to be either fully 
convincing or adequately explicative of the meaning of the structure to be applied to future 
difficult cases."). 
82. In fact, different segments of the opinions suggest different rationales for the hold-
ings. See id. Thus, the Ellerth opinion first suggests "looking to whether the discriminatory 
action had a 'significant' impact on the victim's employment status," second, it stresses that 
TEA's may be identified by virtue of the fact that they "'fall within the special province of 
the supervisor,'" and finally that the TEA requires an official company act. See id. at 72 
(quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62). Justice Souter's Faragher opinion does not cite cases, 
but does cite to the Ellerth decision, which cites cases. 524 U.S. at 807. 
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these ambiguities, lower courts have constricted the definition of 
TEA. The remainder of this Article considers five analytical meth-
ods that have yielded these constrictions in the TEA concept: 
1. Importation into the harassment context of the 
"materially adverse" or "ultimate employment ac-
tion" concepts with which some courts have 
curtailed discrimination claims outside the harass-
ment context; 
2. Focusing on a single item in the Ellerth/Faragher list 
of criteria to consider, to the exclusion of other 
countervailing factors; 
3. Finding, in the Ellerth/Faragher realignment of cate-
gories, alterations of the standards operative within 
the categories; 
4. Recognizing TEA's only in cases in which the super-
visor's action against the plaintiff is in retaliation for 
the plaintiff's declining the supervisor's sexual ad-
vances, rather than in all cases in which harassment 
culminates in a TEA; 
5. Superimposition of retaliation doctrine onto har-
assment analysis. 
A. Importation into the Harassment Context of the "Materially Adverse" 
or "Ultimate Employment Action" Concepts, Which Some Courts 
Have Imposed To Curtail Discrimination Claims 
Outside The Harassment Context 
Despite robust criticism from legal scholars, heightened injury 
requirements have flourished in mainstream (non-harassment) 
discrimination cases, particularly retaliation cases, and are now mi-
grating to the harassment context. 83 In three of the federal circuits, 
83. Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d. 507, 511 (7th Cir. 1999) (relying on pre-
Ellerth material adversity requirement to give content to Ellerth TEA standard); Savino v. C.P. 
Hall Co., 199 F. 3d 925, 932 (7th Cir. 1 999) (TEA is akin to pre-Ellerth concept of adverse 
employment action). But see Guillory v. S. Natural Gas Co., No. 99-2011, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13171, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2000) (TEA is something less than an "ultimate em-
ployment decision"). The corollary is also at work. Some courts have imported into 
mainstream discrimination doctrine the TEA concept developed by the Court for the 
unique circumstance of harassment. See Watson v. Norton, No. 99-1450, 2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 4962, at *21 (lOth Cir. Mar. 26, 2001) (citing Ellerth TEA definition to help define 
"adverse employment action" actionable under section 704 retaliation); Evans v. Houston, 
246 F.3d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Elkrth as demonstrative of requirements for 
SUMMER 2002] After Ellerth 827 
mainstream discrimination plaintiffs (those invoking sections 703 
and/ or 704 of Title VII) who succeed in proving they were victims 
of discrimination nevertheless lose their cases if they fail to meet 
these judicially imposed heightened injury requirements. 84 A court 
imposing such requirements insists that plaintiff prove that the ac-
tion taken against her was "ultimate" or "materially adverse," in 
addition to discriminatory. To meet this requirement, the plaintiff 
usually must show that the challenged action formally altered her 
relationship with the employer,85 whether by discharge, failure to 
h . 86 c d . 87 tre, transter, or emotion. 
showing adverse action under section 704); Shackelford v. DeLoitte & Touche, 190 F.3d 398, 
407 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Ellerth for proposition that Title VII covers only adverse employ-
ment actions); Jones v. Wright State Univ., No. 98-4041, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24334, *3 
(6th Cir. Sept. 28, 1999) (citing Ellerth for proposition that section 703 race and sex dis-
crimination plaintiff must allege material adverse employment action) ; Boone v. Goldin, 178 
F.3d 253, 255 (4th Cir 1999) (citing E11erth for the proposition that Title VII, in general, 
limits liability to cases of TEA). The latter migration poses similar threats to thwart the pro-
tections embodied in Title VII. 
84. Seejohnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv. Inc., 234 F.3d 501 , 512 (lith Cir. 
2000); Savino v. Ha11, 199 F.3d 925, 933 n .8 (7th Cir. 1999); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 
1142 (8th Cir. 1997); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707-08 (5th Cir. 1997); 
Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 1989); Dorsch v. L.B. Foster 
Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1424 (7th Cir. 1986); Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981). 
See generally Ernest F. Lidge III, The Meaning of Discrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in Requir-
ing Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove That the Employer's Action Was Materially Adverse 
or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 333, 348 (1999). But cf. Fierros v. Tex. Dep't of Health, 274 
F.3d 187, 194 (5th Cir. 2001) (denial of pay increase constitutes adverse action for purposes 
of section 704). Although the terms, "ultimate," and "materially adverse," may have slightly 
different connotations, they share for present purposes that meaning that the plaintiff must 
show a formal and harmful alteration in her worklife. Professor Rebecca White has observed 
an increasing trend to impose such heightened harm requirements and suggested that the 
"trend may well be a reaction to the explosion of employment discrimination claims crowd-
ing the dockets of the federal courts." Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 
EMORY LJ. 1121, 1124 (1998) ; see also id. at 1126 (discussing confusion among courts on 
whether and what severity of harm is required to meet the statutory elements of a discrimi-
nation claim and to create and inference sufficient to make a prima facie case of intent) ; 
Anne Henry, Employer and Employee Reasonableness Regarding Retaliation under the 
Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 553, 566 (1999) (noting that 
Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have relied on absence from section 704 retaliation 
provision of language restricting adverse actions to those enumerated in section 703); Eric 
M.D. Zion, Note, Overcoming Adversity: Distinguishing Retaliation from General Prohibitions Under 
Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 76 IND. LJ. 191, 194 (2001) ("maJority of circuits do 
not restrict section 704(a) 's language to such a reading but instead include lesser adverse 
actions with some minimum level of substantiality"). 
85. Cf Savino v. Hall, 199 F.3d 925,932 n.8 (7th Cir 1999) (requiring that employment 
action "cause a substantial detriment to the plaintiff's employment relationship" in order to 
qualify as TEA); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak, 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997) (defining ad-
verse action to include hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting and compensating) . 
86. Discriminatory failure to hire, of course, maintains a status quo that nondiscrimi-
natory decisionmaking might have altered. 
87. Courts have imposed similarly heightened requirements entitled "adverse action" 
and "materially adverse action," which have the same general effect of destroying otherwise 
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The circuits have split on what kind of action is sufficiently se-
vere or important to violate section 704.88 Some courts, such as the 
Fifth Circuit in the case of Mattern v. Eastman Kodak,89 have re-
stricted section 704 claims to "ultimate employment actions," such 
as firing and denial of promotion.90 Such restrictive cases represent 
the view of only a minority of federal circuits.91 The Fourth, Fifth 
and Eighth Circuits have imposed the ultimate harm requirement 
barrier to plaintiffs' retaliation claims.92 Other circuits recognize 
valid Title VII claims. Lidge, supra note 84, at 368-73. Professor Lidge writes: "courts have 
used the adverse action requirement to impose an additional substantive requirement on 
plaintiffs. In doing so, they have rewritten the statute." /d. at 372-73; see alro Melissa A. Essary 
& Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable 
Emp[qyees, Uncertain Empfqyers, Unresolved Courts 63 Mo. L. REv. 115, 152 (1998) (noting that 
Title VII language not restricted to ultimate decisions). In Empluyer and Empluyee Reasonable-
ness Regarding Retaliation under the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, Ann Henry argues 
that the requirement of some courts that plaintiff suffer an "ultimate" employment action to 
bring a 704 retaliation claim conflicts with the Ellerth/Faragher requirement that the victim 
use the employer's channels to report the environmental harassment. Henry, supra note 84, 
at 554-55. 
88. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing split in cir-
cuits: Fifth and Eight Circuits recognize only ultimate employment actions as cognizable 
under section 704; First, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits take expansive view of 
adverse employment actions; Second and Third take intermediate position); Wideman v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998) (describing split in the circuits: 
Eighth and Fifth circuits limit retaliation claims to ultimate employment actions, while First, 
Ninth, and Tenth allow retaliation claims for actions falling short of ultimate employment 
actions); White, supra note 84, at 1142-45. 
89. 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997). 
90. Walker v. Glasfloss, 214 F.3d 615, 629 (5th Cir. 2000) (requiring that adverse em-
ployment actions be "ultimate" in order to be cognizable under section 704 of Title VII) . 
Professor Rebecca White traces the problem to the Fourth Circuit's reliance on language 
contained in a separate section of Title VII (section 717, which governs the federal govern-
ment as employer) to decide on the meaning of the very different language in the section 
704 prohibition against discrimination. See White, supra note 84, at 1136-41. It is ironic that 
the ultimate employment decision requirement that migrated from section 717 through 
section 704 and now to section 703 harassment, was imposed by the Fifth Circuit because, in 
its view, section 703(a) ( 1) excludes the "vague harms" contemplated in section 703(a) (2). 
Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707-08. The "terms and conditions of employment" described in section 
703 (a) ( 1) are precisely the bases for the Supreme Court's Meritur conclusion that hostile 
environment harassment is actionable under Title VII. Clearly, section 703(a)(l) is not lim-
ited to ultimate employment actions. See generally Lidge, supra note 84, at 358-68. 
91. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d at 1243 (only Fifth and Eight circuits limit retalia-
tion claims to ultimate employment actions); Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 
F.3d 875, 878 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that strict ultimate employment action standard of 
the Fifth Circuit is minority position in Federal Circuit courts); Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456 
(only Fifth and Eighth circuits limit retaliation claims to ultimate employment actions). 
92. See Cottman v. Rubin, No. 01-1545, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 8635, at *6 (4th Cir. May 
3, 2002) (no retaliation claim absent ultimate employment action); Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707 
("Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to allow every deci-
sion that might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions" (quoting Dollis v. 
Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781--82 (5th Cir. 1995))); Munday v. Stangler, 126 F.3d at 239, 243 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (Title VII applies to discrimination only if it affects an ultimate employment deci-
sion) (citing Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994)); 
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that Title VII protects against employment discrimination in all its 
many guises.93 These courts have allowed section 704 claims for the 
full spectrum of retaliatory behaviors, regardless of whether those 
behaviors rose to the level of "ultimate employment actions."94 
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit, in Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
found a cognizable adverse employment action when plaintiff's 
manager "reprimanded her, delayed authorizing medical treat-
ment, and asked co-workers to give negative statements about the 
plain tiff. "95 
The ultimate harm requirement conflicts with the language of 
Title VII and with Supreme Court precedent.96 The language of 
section 704, prohibiting retaliation against those seeking to en-
force rights under Title VII, simply makes it "an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to discriminate' on the basis 
of an employee's opposing practices that violate Title VII or par-
ticipating in procedures to challenge such practices.97 Yet the 
leading appellate court decision requiring ultimate action, the 
Fifth Circuit's Mattern v. Eastman Kodak decision read the term "dis-
criminate" to require that the employer's retaliatory act consist of 
an "ultimate employment decision," rather than "an 'interlocutory 
Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 755 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that absent 
discharge, there is insufficient adverse action to support retaliation claim); see Elana Olson, 
Beyond the Scope of Empluyer Liability: Empluyer Failure to Address Retaliation l¥y Co-Workers After 
Title VII Protected Activity, 7 WM. & MARY j. OF WoMEN & L. 239, 258 (2000). 
93. See Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456 (citing Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st 
Cir. 1994); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984-86 (lOth Cir. 1996)); Yartzoff v. 
Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987)); Olson, supra note 92, at 258. 
94. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 84, at 566 n.64 (describing cases that recognize retalia-
tion claims in absence of ultimate employment action). 
95. Ann M. Henry, Empluyer and Empll.ryee Reasonableness Regarding Retaliation under the 
Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 553,562 (1999); see Wideman, 141 
F.3d at 1456 (citing Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15-16; Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d at 984-86; 
Yartzoffv. Thomas, 809 F.2d at 1375); Olson, supra note 92, at 258. 
96. See Wideman, 141 F."3d at 1456 (plain language of section 704 imposes no ultimate 
employment action requirement). 
97. In pertinent part, section 704 states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against 
any of his employees ... because [the employee) has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). 
Some authors have argued that the lack of qualifier in this text renders actionable a 
broader range of employer acts than are actionable under section 703. See Zion, supra note 
84, at 198; cf Essary & Friedman, supra note 87, at 141 ("anti-retaliation provision, which is 
not limited to a specific definition, as is the substantive discrimination provision, may be 
construed more broadly than the substantive anti-discrimination provisions"). 
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or mediate' decision which can lead to an ultimate decision."98 The 
Mattern court drew this conclusion largely from identical language 
in section 703, which is the statute's general prohibition against 
discrimination.99 The Mattern court distinguished between the two 
essential elements of section 703. One prohibits all discrimination 
in employment decisions, including those pertaining to compensa-
tion, terms, conditions and privileges of employment; the other 
forbids limiting, segregating, or classifying workers in a way that 
tends to deprive an individual of opportunities or adversely affect 
l 100 emp oyment status. 
The Fifth Circuit's Mattern decision relied on the distinctions be-
tween these two subsections of section 703 to justifY an 
insupportable reading of section 704. To define the term, "dis-
criminate" in section 704, the Mattern court looked to the use of 
that term in section 703(a) (1). 101 The court concluded that the 
term "discriminate" in section 703(a)(l) is much narrower than 
section 703 (a) (2) 's language "limiting employees in ways that tend 
to deprive them of opportunities. "102 The court then leaped to the 
conclusion that because " [ t] he anti-retaliation provision[, like sec-
tion 703(a) (1 ),] speaks only of "discrimination" [without mention] 
of the vague harms contemplated in [703](a)(2), [section 704 
98. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708. Mattern is one of the earliest and most significant circuit 
court decisions to impose an ultimate employment requirement. The Mattern court drew 
upon two earlier decisions, neither of which squarely stood for the proposition that section 
704 retaliation claims are limited to ultimate employment actions. One was the Fourth Cir-
cuit case of Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1981), which construed the term "personnel 
action" in section 717 of Title VII (governing suits against the federal government) to mean 
ultimate employment action. /d. at 233. The other was the Fifth Circuit's own earlier deci-
sion in Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777 (5th Cir. 1995), which relied on Page to require ultimate 
employment actions to challenge a federal personnel action under section 717. 
/d. 
99. 104 F.3d at 708-09. 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
( 1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual's color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
101. 104 F.3d at 708-09. 
102. !d. 
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must] be read to exclude such vague harms, and to include only 
ultimate employment decisions."103 
The problem with the court relying on section 703(a) (1) in this 
way is that section 703(a) (1) itself does not in any way limit action-
able claims to ultimate employment actions. In fact, the Supreme 
Court rejected precisely this narrowing construction of section 
703 (a) (1) in its 1986 Meritor decision. When the Meritor Court rec-
ognized that section 703(a) (1) allows a claim for hostile 
environment harassment, it expressly rejected the argument that 
section 703(a) (1) imposes any ultimate decision requirement,104 
concluding that: "[T] he language of Title VII is not limited to 
"'economic'" or "tangible" discrimination. The phrase "'terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment' " evinces a congressional 
intent '"to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
d ,, . 1 ,105 men an women In emp oyment. 
The language of the statute, as construed by the Supreme Court, 
thus imposes no limits on actionability of discrimination under sec-
tion 703(a) (1), as long as the discrimination affects a term, 
condition, or privilege of employment, which need not be of eco-
nomic or ultimate consequence, but may instead be "merely" 
environmental or mediate.106 Given the absence from the statutory 
103. Id. 
104. 477 U.S. 57, 58 (1986) (citing Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 
435 u.s. 702 (1978)) . 
105. Id. at 64. The statute and legislative history do not define the term "discrimina-
tion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1; Robert Brookins, A Rose By Any Other Name .. . The Gender Basis Of 
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 441,499 (1998) . In Faragher, the Court stated: 
We have repeatedly made clear that although the statute mentions specific employ-
ment decisions with immediate consequences, the scope of the prohibition " 'is not 
limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination,'" Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 
510 U.S. 17 (1993) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64), and that it covers more than 
" ' terms' and 'conditions' in the narrow contractual sense." Oncale v. Sundowner Off 
shore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998). 
524 U.S. at 786. 
106. On the meaning of the term "discrimination, Professor Gudel has written: 
Title VII does not define "discrimination.'' However, it does provide that only certain 
kinds of discrimination are unlawful-namely, those engaged in "because of' one of 
the bases specified in the Act. One must understand "discrimination," then, despite 
its normally pejorative connotation, as a neutral term in Title VII. Discrimination 
simply means treating some employees differently from others. Of course, employers 
treat some employees differently from others every day-some are fired while others 
are not, some are promoted or given raises while others are not, some applicants are 
hired while others are turned away. None of these "discriminations" are illegal. The 
only illegal discriminations are those made "because of' race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. Therefore, the entire task of elaborating the substantive reach of 
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text of any heightened harm restrictions and the Supreme Court's 
express rejection of the heightened harm requirements, the lower 
courts' persistence in imposing such requirements is bizarre. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that legal scholars have consistently ar-
gued against heightened harm requirements.107 
Perhaps the most telling evidence that section 704 retaliation 
claims are not limited to ultimate actions is implicit in the Su-
preme Court's 1997 decision in Robinson v. Shell OiL 108 In Robinson, 
the Court confronted the question of whether section 704 reaches 
retaliation against former employees. The plaintiff in Robinson, a 
former Shell Oil employee, alleged that Shell Oil retaliated against 
Robinson after the termination of Robinson's employment, by giv-
ing a negative reference in connection with Robinson's application 
for a position with a different employer.109 The Supreme Court 
held that a current employer-employee relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant is not a prerequisite to a retaliation 
claim under section 704. Because the negative impact of retaliation 
in post-employment cases like Robinson's necessarily is on the 
plaintiff's employment relationship with a potential future em-
ployer, rather than with the defendant, section 704 necessarily 
encompasses retaliatory measures that do not in the least affect 
Title VII-the task of determining exactly which actions violate the statute and which 
do not-hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "because of." 
Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in 
EmpluymentDiscriminationLaw, 70TEx. L. REv. 17,21-22 (1991). 
107. See gent?rally Ernest Lidge, supra note 84, and Rebecca Hannt?r l-Vhite, supra note 84. 
Cf Essary & Friedman, supra note 87, at 135-37. Essary & Friedman note that: 
[C]ourts employing the strict ultimate employment decision standard, have relied 
expressly on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Page v. Bolgt?ras the genesis of their hold-
ings. However, these courts' exclusive reliance on Page is misplaced, most 
fundamentally so because Page simply did not concern an anti-retaliation clause. 
Rather, Page addressed a plaintiff's attempt to rewrite the prima facie case require-
ments in a failure-to-promote case brought under 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-16(a), a 
particular section of Title VII which deals only with discrimination in federal em-
ployment and which itself requires that there be a "personnel action," not merely 
"discrimination." 
/d. at 135-36 (citations omitted). 
108. 519 U.S. 337 (1997); see joel Kravetz, Deterrence v. Material Harm: Finding the A~ 
priate Standard to Define an "Adverse Action" in Retaliation Claims Brought Under the Applicabk 
Equal Employment opportunity Statutes, 4 U . PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 315, 363-64 (2002) (relying 
on Robinson in argument that section 704 adverse employment action should receive broad 
construction). 
109. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 338. 
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(ultimately or otherwise) the relationship between the defending 
employer and the plaintiff-employee. 110 
By definition, the ultimate employment action requirement is 
inconsistent with Robinson. In setting forth the specifics of the ulti-
mate action requirement, the Mattern court stated that "Title VII's 
anti-retaliation provision refers to ultimate employment decisions, 
and not to an 'interlocutory or mediate' decision which can lead to an ul-
timate decision." 111 A negative reference or any other negative action 
by a fOT71'lCY' employer cannot constitute an ultimate decision, inas-
much as the former employer has no power to take ultimate action 
against someone no longer on its payroll. One district court in the 
Fifth Circuit, the source of the Mattern ultimate action require-
ment, construed the ultimate requirement in combination with the 
Robinson rule to permit former employees to sue their former em-
ployers for retaliation only if the retaliatory act would affect 
prospective future employers' ultimate decisions about that ern-
ployee.112 This lower court concluded that a negative reference 
letter sent in retaliation for plaintiff's protected acts did not 
amount to an adverse employment action cognizable under section 
704 because the letter did not result in the potential employer tak-
ing ultimate action against the plaintiff. 113 The district court's 
valiant effort to reconcile Mattern and Robinson was destined to fail 
because Mattern forbids retaliation suits for mediate actions, and a 
former employer's action is necessarily mediate, capable of harm-
ing the plaintiff only by influencing a decision by the future 
1 114 emp oyer. 
110. See Bernofsky v. Tulane Educal. Fund, No. 98-1792, 2000 U .S. Dist. Lexis 5561, at 
*1~19 (E.D. La. April 18, 2000) (suggesting that Fifth Circuit should revisit the Mattern rule 
in light of Robinson). But see Forde v. Brinker Rest. Corp., No. 3:96-CV-1994-D, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6277, at *6 n.2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 1998) (rejecting argument that Robinson should 
alter the Mattern requirement that retaliation plaintiffs show ultimate employment action). 
111. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708 (emphasis added). 
112. Bemojsky, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5561, at *1~19. 
113. /d .. But see Hecht v. GAF Corp., 95 Civ. 10379 (RPP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5946, at 
*10 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 28, 1999) (when EMPLOYER has refused to provide a reference, it would 
be a fool's errand to require plaintiff to show exactly how further adverse job conse-
quences-i.e., impediments to obtaining future employmenlr-were affected by this refusal). 
The Bemofsky court tempered the Robinson rule that the no-longer employed may sue their 
former employees with the Mattern rule that only ultimate employment actions can give rise 
to retaliation claims by requiring that the plaintiff show that the adverse action affected an 
ultimate employment decision in connection with future employment for which the plaintiff 
was applying. The Bemofsky court also suggested, however, that the Fifth Circuit could prof-
itably revisit the Mattern decision, with an aim to easing the ultimate employment action 
requirement. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5561, at *18. 
114. In fact, a court's finding actionable harm by virtue of the effect of discrimination 
on a plaintiff's relationship with an employer other than the defendant is not entirely with-
out precedent. See Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
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The EEOC Compliance Manual also rejects heightened harm 
requirements: 
Some courts have held that the retaliation proVIsiOns apply 
only to retaliation that takes the form of ultimate employment 
actions. Others have construed the provisions more broadly, 
but have required that the action materially affect the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment. 
The Commission disagrees with those decisions and con-
cludes that such constructions are unduly restrictive. The 
statutory retaliation clauses prohibit any adverse treatment 
that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to 
deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected 
activity. Of course, petty slights and trivial annoyances are not 
actionable, as they are not likely to deter protected activity. 
More significant retaliatory treatment, however, can be chal-
lenged regardless of the level of harm. As the [N] inth Circuit 
has stated, the degree of harm suffered by the individual 
"goes to the issue of damages, not liability."u:. 
Critics contend that heightened harm requirements confuse the 
elements of the statutory cause of action with the elements of the 
McDonnell Douglas116 prima facie case, a proof structure that was de-
vised for cases in which the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of motive 
or intent.117 Professor "White has argued, for example, that the ma-
teriality or ultimate employment action requirement is not 
appropriate when injected as an element of the statutory claim, but 
may be appropriate in cases where the plaintiff is using circumstan-
tial evidence under McDonnell Douglas to create an inference of 
(by using term "person aggrieved," rather than "employee," statute extends beyond em-
ployer-employee relationships). 
115. 115 EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 8, 146 (1998) (citations omitted). 
116. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 ( 1973) 
117. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp. , 108 F. 3d 246, 250 (9th Cir. 1997) (" McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine elements irrelevant if plaintiff advances direct evidence of discrimination."); 
Lidge, supra note 84, at 348; White, supra note 84 at 1142-45; see also Kormoczy v. United 
States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 53 F.3d 821 , 824 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Where direct evi-
dence is used to show that a housing decision was made in violation of the statute, the 
burden shifting analysis is inapposite."); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1006 (9th 
Cir. 1985) ("plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment without satisfy-
ing the McDonnell Douglas test.") ; Wooten v. Acme Steel Co, 986 F. Supp. 524, 527 (N.D. Ill. 
1997) (distinguishing between statutory elements and McDonnell Douglas prima facie case); 
Frank Lopez, Using the Fair Housing A ct to Combat Predatory Lending, 6 GEO. J. ON Pov. L. & 
PoL'Y 73, 99 n.201 (stating that the "validity of a fair housing complaint should be judged by 
the statutory e lements of an FHA claim rather than the structure of the prima facie case"). 
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discriminatory intent or motive. Under McDonnell Douglas, courts 
give such plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt, permitting an infer-
ence of discriminatory intent in the absence of direct evidence, but 
only if the action in question is sufficiently adverse or ultimate to 
look suspicious. The differences between the statutory elements 
and the McDonnell Douglas elements are significant, as are the 
ramifications of the plaintiff's proving them.118 The McDonnell 
Douglas proof scheme goes only to the statutory element of 
intent. 119 The statutory elements, once proven, entitle the plaintiff 
to relief, unless the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, all of the elements of an affirmative defense. 120 Thus, as a 
rule the plaintiff who proves the elements of the statutory claim, 
wins her case. Under McDonnell Douglas, by contrast, the plaintiff's 
proof of the prima facie elements simply shifts to the defendant a 
burden of production to introduce evidence of a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. The heightened 
harm requirements may be legitimate elements of proof for 
plaintiffs who wish to take advantage of the McDonnell Douglas 
presumption because they lack direct evidence of discriminatory 
motive, but they should not be injected as statutory elements for 
plaintiffs who are not invoking the McDonnell Douglas 
118. Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 249; see also Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 
715 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[i]t is always open to a plaintiff in a discrimination case to 
show in a conventional way, without relying on any special doctrines of burden-shifting, that 
there is enough evidence, direct or circumstantial, of discrimination to create a triable is-
sue."); Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1993). The failure 
to plead the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case does not mean that the plaintiff would be 
unable to advance direct evidence of discrimination, in which case the prima facie case is 
irrelevant. Gilligan 108 F.3d at 250. The McDonnell Douglas case simply allows a plaintiff who 
Jacks direct evidence of discriminatory motive to avoid summary judgment or judgment as a 
matter of law. If plaintiff proves the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, she 
avoids summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law on the issue of intent, forcing the 
defendant to put in its case. Defendant can neutralize the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case 
by producing evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. McDonnell Douglas 411 U.S. 
at 802. 
119. The plaintiff's proving the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case has 
the effect not merely of permitting the inference that the defendant was motivated by dis-
crimination, but actually establishes "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that the 
defendant was so motivated. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 
(1996); Texas Dep't ofCmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981). 
120. The only statutory affirmative defense to intentional discrimination under Title VII 
is the bona fide occupational qualification defense. See Int'l Union v.Johnson Controls, 499 
U.S. 187, 201 (1991). Defendant may also reduce its monetary liability by proving that it 
would have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motive, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e, or by demonstrating that, after-acquired evidence would have caused it to make the 
same decision if it had known. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362-
63 (1995). In the harassment context, of course, the Ellerth/Faragher decisions have added 
the affirmative defense, which does not undo the fact of the violation, but exempts the em-
ployer from remedying it. 
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are not invoking the McDonnell Douglas presumption.121 It is espe-
cially inappropriate for courts to add such extra hurdles under 
statutes whose remedial nature calls for liberal construction. Court 
activism to give access to statutory protection is consistent with 
statutory purpose. Court activism to curtail access is not. 
If heightened hann requirements are unfounded, then argu-
ments importing the heightened hann requirements whole cloth 
to give content to the TEA concept are similarly flawed. 122 Despite 
critiques, courts that have adopted heightened harm requirements 
in retaliation cases under section 704 have begun to adopt the re-
quirement in TEA analysis under section 703, as well.123 
Admittedly, arguments can be made that, wrong as such height-
ened hann requirements may be in the straight Title VII context, 
they are-for some reason-proper in defining TEA's in the dis-
crete context of determining availability of the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense for harassment cases. As discussed below, how-
ever, the language of Ellerth/Faragher counsels against importing 
heightened hann doctrine into harassment jurisprudence. Courts 
that subscribe to the heightened harm requirement (and some 
that do not) understandably have imported that concept into the 
TEA context. 124 Indeed, Justice Kennedy's Ellerth opinion cited, 
though declined to approve the results in, several cases in which 
courts had imposed heightened hann requirements. 125 Justice 
Souter's Faragher opinion, though referring with approval to the 
Ellerth opinion, made no independent references to these stringent 
121. See White, supra note 84, at 1142-45, 1171-82. Needless to say, standing doctrines 
protect against pursuit of claims involving no injury, and presumably require that plaintiffs 
show hann in order to proceed. Title VII, by its terms (by its silence, actually) leaves to the 
victim of discrimination to decide whether the effects hurt enough to warrant litigation. The 
scope of standing under Title VII is identical to that of Article III standing generally. W. Carl 
Jordan, Employment Discrimination Law, 1998 SuPP., A B.A. SEc. LABOR & EMPLOYMENT L. 420 
(citing cases); see also Lidge, supra note 84, at 348; White, supra note 84, at 1142-45, 1171-
1182. Professor Lidge traces courts' misplaced reliance on precedent to develop a height-
ened hann requirement. He explains that courts' requiring a showing of material adversity 
confuses issues of how to prove intent with issues of statutory coverage. Professor Lidge has 
argued that the heightened harm requirements began simply as shorthand for the require-
ment in 703(a) (1) that the employer discriminate in the terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment, rather than as an independent requirement that plaintiff prove a certain de-
gree of harm. Lidge, supra note 84, at 348. 
122. Cf Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505,510 n.5 {5th Cir. 1999) (declining to decide 
whether the Ellerth TEA and the Mattern ultimate employment action are equivalents). 
123. See Bemofsky, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5561, at *16-19; Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 
172, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying Ellerth to find no tangible employment action in the 
absence of ultimate alteration in job status the plaintiff) . 
124. Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir. 1999) (relying on pre-
Ellerth material adversity requirement to give content to Ellerth TEA standard). 
125. 524 U.S. 742, 761 (citing Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 
(7th Cir. 1993), and other cases limiting the scope ofTitle VII). 
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appellate court cases. 126 In fact, however, both the language and 
rationale of the Ellerth/Faragher decisions counsel against height-
ened harm as a test for whether the supervisor's act is a TEA. 
The language of the opinions includes an articulation of factors 
for identifying TEA's that suggests a definition far broader than 
merely ultimate employment actions. In particular, the Court, in 
listing factors relevant to the TEA assessment, stated that neither 
causation of economic harm nor report to and review by higher 
management, constituted necessary conditions to an action being a 
TEA.127 Yet, economic harm and reporting to upper management 
are the hallmarks of the ultimate employment action concept. If an 
employment action can qualify as a TEA without having economic 
consequences and without being reported to upper management, 
then employment actions need not be ultimate in order to be 
TEA's. 
Like the Ellerth/Faragher textual description of the concept, the 
Court's underlying rationale suggests that the TEA concept en-
compasses far more than ultimate employment actions. The 
Ellerth/Faragher Court viewed its overarching task to be the integra-
tion of agency law principles with the objectives of Title VII in the 
development of a standard for employer liability for harassment. 128 
The Court began by considering each of the potential grounds for 
vicarious liability set forth in REsTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF AGENCY 
§ 219!29 Of the RESTATEMENT subsections at issue, the Court 
viewed two as potentially applicable to imputation of supervisor 
harassment to the employer: "within the scope of employment" 
and "aided by the agency relationship."130 The Court gave two rea-
sons for selecting the latter in preference to the former: ( 1) agency 
law is not consistent on the issue of whether harassment is or is not 
within the scope of employment, so would give no answer anyway; 
and (2) if harassment (which certainly appears in no job descrip-
tions!) is within the scope of supervisor authority, it would also be 
within the scope of co-worker authority, and yet employers have 
never been vicariously liable for co-worker harassment in the ab-
sence of employer negligence.•s• By contrast, the "aided by the 
126. 524 U.S. at 808. In fact, justice Souter includes in a list of TEA's "undesirable reas-
signment," along with discharge and demotion. /d. 
127. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. 
128. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 n.3. 
129. Id. at 793-804. 
130. ld. at 793, 801. 
131. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799-802. The Faragher Court acknowledged that "supervisors 
have special authority enhancing their capacity to harass, and that the employer can guard 
against their misbehavior more easily because their numbers are by definition fewer than 
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agency relationship" prong of the RESTATEMENT Section 219 stan-
dard has the advantage of distinguishing between supervisor and 
co-worker harassers. 132 While the agency relationship helps both 
supervisors and co-workers in the sense that it gives them proximity 
to the victim, it helps the supervisor more because: 
[a] n employee generally cannot check a supervisor's abusive 
conduct the same way that she might deal with abuse from a 
co-worker. When a fellow employee harasses, the victim can 
walk away or tell the offender where to go, but it may be diffi-
cult to offer such responses to a supervisor, whose "power to 
supervise-which may be to hire and fire, and to set work 
schedules and pay rates--does not disappear . . . when he 
chooses to harass through insults and offensive gestures, 
rather than directly with threats of firing or promises of pro-
tl. "133 moon. 
In essence, the Court proceeded under the "aided by the agency 
relationship" standard because that standard can accommodate 
the crucial difference between supervisor and co-worker harassers. 
Although the agency relationship empowers both types of harass-
ers, since both gain access to their victims by virtue of their jobs, 
only the supervisor is empowered to take employment actions 
against the victim, which power allows the supervisor (but not the 
co-worker harasser) to intimidate the subordinate into submitting 
to the harassment. 134 The Ellerth/Faragher Court thus selected the 
TEA as the critical indicator that the harasser was indeed "misusing 
supervisory authority" because it wanted to preserve the traditional 
rule that rejects strict liability for co-worker harassment. 135 Because 
supervisors (for whose harassment employers should be strictly li-
able) are, by definition, wielders of power that employers delegate 
to them to take legitimate TEA's against subordinates and because 
co-equal employees by definition lack that power, the occurrence 
the numbers of regular employees," but "because of the virtues of categorical clarity," chose 
to analyze the issue under the aided by the agency relationship standard. /d. at 800-01. 
132. !d. at 803. 
133. /d. at 803 (quoting Estrich, supra note 76, at 854). 
134. The nature of the affirmative defense mirrors this foundation of the distinction be-
tween TEA and environmental liability. The affirmative defense is available in the 
environmental case because, in the words of the Faragher Court: "Whether the agency rela-
tion aids in commission of supervisor harassment which does not culminate in a TEA is less 
obvious." /d. at 763. 
135. /d. at 804. 
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of a TEA is a bright-line test for determining whether or not the 
harasser was aided by the agency relationship.136 
The Ellerth/Faragher Court defined TEA's as actions in which the 
supervisor necessarily employs powers delegated by the employer. 
A TEA thus is an action that only a supervisor has the power to 
take. If a co-equal employee could have done the deed, the deed 
does not qualify. This is the crux of the TEA definition. The Court 
drew the essential demarcation between TEA's and non-
TEA/ environmental cases in order to exclude co-worker harass-
ment cases from the rule of uniform imputation. The key, then, is 
not so much the dimension of the action taken against the subor-
dinate, but the source of the power the supervisor uses to take that 
action. If that power is derived from the authority the supervisor 
derives from his relationship with the employer, the action taken is 
a TEA, regardless of whether it alters the subordinate's status in an 
ultimate sense. If the power is nothing more than the power that 
any employee receives from being included in the workplace, then 
the action is not a TEA. 
B. Focusing On A Single Item In The Ellerth/Faragher List of Criteria 
To Consider, Rather Than Considering All Factors 
In Ellerth/Faragher, the Supreme Court identified qualities that 
characterize an act as a TEA. A TEA 
1. "falls within the special province of the supervisor, 
[who] has been empowered by the company as a 
distinct class of agent to make economic decisions 
136. The Court rejected a test tha t would have found the supervisor to have been aided 
by the agency relationship only where the supervisor expressly and affirmative used dele-
gated authority because it would under-identify TEA's. /d. at 805. The Court believed that 
such a test would fail to capture some instances in which supervisors were discrete enough 
that the fact that they were affirmatively using such power would be difficult to detect. /d. at 
804. The tendency of courts and commentators to create or construe substantive employ-
ment discrimination law in ways that cut off protections for the express objective of avoiding 
burdens on courts and the EEOC is odd. Substantive employment discrimination rights are 
not luxuries to be curtailed when their protection is inconvenient any more than the crimi-
nal laws against drug-use or dealing are to be toned down because of court burdens. The 
Faragher Court, in explaining why it was drawing the line benveen TEA cases (absolute liabil-
ity) and environmental cases (voidable liability) characterized cases on the absolute liability 
side of the divide thus: "There is nothing remarkable in the fact that claims against employ-
ers for discriminatory employment actions with tangible results, like hiring, firing, 
promotion , compensation, and work assignment, have resulted in employer liability once 
the discrimination was shown." /d. at 790. 
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affecting other employees under his or her con-
trol"·137 
' 
2. "[is] the means by which the supervisor brings the 
official power of the enterprise to bear on subordi-
nates"; 138 
3. requires an official act of the enterprise, a company 
act; 
4. constitutes a significant change in employment 
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, re-
assignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, denial of a raise or a decision caus-
ing a significant change in benefits; 
5. in most cases inflicts direct economic harm; 
6. in most cases is documented in official company re-
cords, and may be subject to review by higher level 
. 139 
supemsors. 
By their terms, the first four of these factors are essential condi-
tions to finding an act to be a TEA. The last two, economic harm 
and documentation/review, are typical, but not inevitable, charac-
teristics of a TEA.140 By treating these two traits in this way, the 
Court evinced an intent that decision makers engage in analysis 
responsive to the context. For example, there may be cases where 
the employee is NOT harmed economically, but in which it is nev-
ertheless decided that the supervisor's act constitutes a TEA.141 
Likewise, there may be situations in which the action taken is not 
reported and does not receive higher management's imprimatur, 
but is nevertheless a TEA. The opportunity for upper management 
137. EUerth, 524 U.S. at 762. 
138. !d. 
139. !d. at 761-62. 
140. Although economic harm often received emphasis in prior case law, see Crady v. 
Liberty Nat'!. Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993), post-EUerth courts have 
observed the Supreme Court's caution that economic harm is not a necessary condition for 
the finding of a TEA. See johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv. Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 
513 (11th Cir. 2000) (fact of economic harm is dispositive in favor of finding TEA, but, ab-
sent economic hann, fact-finder must assess whether reasonable person would have found 
transfer to constitute TEA); Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. 
Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (lOth Cir. 1998);jeffries v. State of Kansas, 147 F.3d 
1220, 1232 (lOth Cir. 1998); Bonora v. UGI Utils., Inc. , No. 99-5539, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15172, *18-22 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2000) (absence of economic harm not dispositive of TEA 
issue); Kause v. Alberto-Culver Co., No. 97 C3085, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10986 (N.D. Ill. 
June 28, 2000); Steven D. Baderian, et al., Symposium: Managing Empluyment Risks In Light Of 
The New Rulings In Sexual Harassment Law 21 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 343, 361 (1999). 
141. Cf United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375 (5th Cir 2001); United States v. Carroll, 
190 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2000); SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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to review may be crucial in many cases, but will not be helpful in 
other cases. Nevertheless, Professor Michael Harper has argued 
that the last listed factor, "documentation and opportunity for re-
view," is the only one that really matters, and has advocated 
limiting TEA's to those supervisor acts that are "recorded or re-
ported," and that receive the higher management's imprimatur!42 
Professor Harper's article responds to a perceived want of per-
suasive supporting rationale in the Ellerth/Faragher opinions.143 
Harper sets out to supply a policy analysis to correct the opinions' 
"formulaic" use of agency principles and truncated invocation of 
Title VII policy and precedent, which leave the opinion neither 
"convincing" nor "adequately explicative of the meaning of the 
structure to be applied to future difficult cases."144 The primary 
purpose of his article is to supply rationale and policy justifications 
in support of the Ellerth/Faragher decision to allow the defense in 
non-TEA cases. 145 In Harper's view, the reason why allowing defen-
dants an affirmative defense in environmental harassment cases 
makes sense is that victims of non-TEA harassment can "prevent 
discrimination at lower cost than controlling management," except 
where management has failed to make accessible safe channels for 
employees to complain!46 According to Harper, upper manage-
ment can, with little cost, control discrimination in formal job 
actions "because such decisions have been made available for re-
view and have been effectively passed on or acquiesced [in] by 
• "147 
semor management. 
Relying on the sound rationale that he has supplied for the 
Court's decision, Harper then argues that TEA's should be limited 
to those job actions as to which "the discriminating supervisor has 
recorded or reported his discriminatory action so that it is readily 
available for review."148 Professor Harper states that "employers are 
lower cost-avoiders of discriminatory actions that are overt and thus 
subject to review; employee victims may be lower cost avoiders only 
of covert actions that have not been reported to management. "14\J 
142. Harper, supra note 55, at 75. 
143. /d. at 41. 
144. /d. at 49. 
145. ld. 
146. /d. at 64. 
147. /d. at 66. 
148. /d. at 75. 
149. /d. at 75 (emphasis added). In fact, the supposed dichotomy is not inevitable. 
Thus, the discriminating supervisor may, knowing that his bias motivates a hiring decision, 
be especially diligent in documenting the nondiscriminatory justifications for the decision, 
or the harassing supervisor may be quite obvious when engaging in harassment so severe or 
pervasive that it creates an actionably hostile environment. 
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Although Professor Harper's rationale supplies a good argument 
for including in the TEA category actions that are official and on 
the record, it does not warrant excluding actions that are not on 
the record. Other cost-based rationales can be made for the 
Court's line drawing. Cost-avoidance arguments can also be made 
for including as TEA's actions that make use of delegated author-
ity, regardless of whether or not they receive review at higher levels. 
Professor Harper's argument focuses on post-TEA correction and 
employer opportunity to correct actions that are official and on the 
record. A similar cost-avoidance argument can be made for pre-
TEA cost-avoidance. The employer is capable of and responsible 
for cost-avoidance in hiring and training supervisors in how to use 
the power delegated to them in a nondiscriminatory way. 
C. Finding in the Ellerth/Faragher Realignment of Categories, 
Alterations of the Standards Operative Within the Categories. 
One court has read in Ellerth/Faragher a suggestion that TEA's 
differ from the "tangible job detriment" that had previously oper-
ated in quid pro quo analysis. 150 This court imposed a higher 
employer action hurdle than plaintiffs bore under the quid pro 
quo structure. 151 Yet, in the Supreme Court's transition from quid 
pro quo to TEA and from 'job detriment" to "employment action" 
there is no evidence of such a shift. 
Mter moving from the quid pro quo/ environmental paradigm 
to the TEA/non-TEA paradigm what had previously qualified as 
quid pro quo harassment continued to qualifY for absolute liability 
as a TEA. Although the Court listed factors courts might consider 
in ascertaining whether a given supervisor act qualified as a TEA, it 
based that list on pre-existing lower court doctrine. Thus, a pre-
Ellerth court that would have recognized a particular employer act 
as quid pro quo harassment should, post-Ellerth, recognize the 
same act, if actually carried out, as TEA harassment. 
The effect of Ellerth/Faragher was to redraw the boundary be-
tween the category of cases that warrant absolute liability, and the 
category of cases that do not. The opinion in Ellerth suggests that 
the types of supervisor acts that had previously qualified to estab-
lish quid pro quo harassment would now, if actuated, qualifY as 
150. Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998), superceding Reinhold v. Virginia, 
135 F.3d 920 (4th Cir. 1998). 
151. !d. at 174-75. 
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TEA harassment. The focus was not on the nature of the acts 
threatened and whether they were sufficiently adverse, but on the 
fact that Ellerth's harasser had never acted on his threats. 152 In cir-
cuits that had previously limited absolute employer liability to quid 
pro quo cases, Ellerth/Faragher effectively expanded the category of 
absolute liability cases to include hostile environments that culmi-
nated in a TEA, but involved no libido-driven or quid pro quo 
demands or threats. 
In Reinhold v. Virginia, 153 however, the Fourth Circuit concluded 
that the Ellerth case not only imposed a requirement that the 
threatened act be carried out, but also altered the types of em-
ployer acts that, carried out, would be harsh enough to invoke the 
rule of uniform imputation. 154 Prior to the Supreme Court's Ellerth 
decision, Reinhold won her quid pro quo harassment case before a 
jury, and the trial and appellate courts upheld that verdict. 155 Once 
the Supreme Court issued its Ellerth decision, however, the panel 
reheard the case in light of Ellerth, 156 and concluded that facts 
amounting to a "tangible job detriment" for purposes of quid pro 
quo harassment did not amount to a "TEA" under the 
Ellerth/Faragher standard. 157 
A psychologist at the Virginia School for the Deaf and Blind, 
Reinhold suffered her supervisor's unwanted sexual advances for 
eighteen months.158 The supervisor, Dennis Martin, conducted an 
ongoing campaign of harassment. 159 He entered Reinhold's office 
and there recited a poem about the first time he masturbated, gave 
Reinhold "pills containing sexually explicit messages," required 
Reinhold to come to his office, where he repeatedly confessed his 
attraction to her and professed an inability to control his feelings 
for her. 160 Martin tried to kiss Reinhold, telephoned her at home 
(aware that Reinhold's spouse was often away on business) and 
152. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754. 
153. 151 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 1998). 
154. /d. at 174-75. The Fourth Circuit first addressed the Reinhold case in Reinhold v. 
Virginia, 135 F.3d 920 (4th Cir. 1998) (Reinhold 1). The court vacated Reinhold /when it re-
considered the case in light of Faragher and Ellerth. Reinhold v. Virginia, 151 F. 3d. 172 (4th 
Cir. 1998) (Reinhold II) . The vacated Reinhold I opinion remains relevant, however, because 
the Fourth Circuit's second opinion incorporated by reference the Reinhold I statement of 
facts. Reinhold II, 151 F.3d at 173. 
155. Reinhold II, 151 F.3d at 174. 
156. /d. 
157. !d. at 175. 
158. Reinhold I, 135 F.3d at 923. She counseled children, performed psychological test-
ing, and worked with teachers on student behavioral problems. She also completed the 
psychological portions of triennial evaluations for each student. /d. at 923. 
159. /d. at 925--27. 
160. /d. 
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threatened to retaliate for Reinhold's rejection of his advances.161 
Ultimately, the jury concluded that he did retaliate in at least two 
ways. First, when Reinhold refused Martin's invitation to attend a 
professional conference alone with him/62 Martin selected two 
other employees to accompany him and rejected Reinhold's appli-
cation to participate. 163 Second, as Reinhold increased her 
protestations, Martin increased Reinhold's workload, including 
work that was entirely outside her job responsibilities. 164 
Initially, Reinhold refrained from complaining to school offi-
cials.165 She feared that Martin would harm her physically if he 
learned that she had reported him and she knew that Martin had a 
close relationship with school management.166 Mter she had en-
dured the harassment for eighteen months, however, Reinhold 
finally on March 9, 1992 reported Martin's behavior to Ruth Ber-
man, the school's business manager, and to the school's human 
resources director. 167 On the same day, as soon as she had made this 
report, Reinhold left work and remained on leave until March 18, 
1992.168 Upon investigating Reinhold's complaint, the school ini-
tially imposed penalties on Martin, but reduced the severity of 
those penalties because of Martin's "previously outstanding work 
performance and dedication to his job."169 
When Reinhold returned to her duties on March 18th, she was 
assigned to a different building, while Martin was permitted to re-
tain his office.170 Not only was Reinhold's new office space 
inadequate for the work she had to do, but it was located in a 
161. /d. On one occasion, when Reinhold threatened to report the harassment, Martin 
said that no one would believe her. Reinhold informed him that she had retained copies of 
poems he had given her. Martin responded by putting his hands around her neck and say-
ing, "surely you threw those out." /d. at 925. When Reinhold persisted in her contention that 
she had, indeed, retained them, Martin responded that what he had done earlier was not 
sexual harassment, but that "this [was]," attempting to kiss her. /d. When Reinhold confided 
to co-worker Kathy Verano, about Martin's behavior, the two women developed a system 
whereby Verano would interrupt any private meetings between Martin and Reinhold that 
exceeded five minutes in duration. ld. 
162. Martin repeatedly invited Reinhold to accompany him on vacations. ld. at 926. She 
responded that she was happily married and she advised him to vacation with his own wife. 
/d. 
163. ld. 
164. ld. at 925. 
165. /d. at 926. 
166. ld. 
167. ld. at 923, 926. 
168. ld at 926. Reinhold was subsequently diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder and depression caused by the harassment and the inadequacy of the school's 
response. ld. at 928. 
169. ld. at 927. 
170. /d. The school said this measure was required because of the equipment needed 
for his work. /d. 
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building that was especially prone to racial tension, where Rein-
hold was subjected to racial slurs and hostility, including exhibition 
of posters expressing support for Martin.171 When Reinhold com-
plained to Berman and human resources about the hostility to 
which she was being subjected in her new location, the school re-
fi d k . 172 use to ta e actiOn. 
Finally, on March 27, with the approval of the school's superin-
tendent, Martin circulated an exculpatory memorandum, 
trivializing the harassment incident that had caused him to lose his 
role as department coordinator. 173 In Reinhold's view, the school's 
approval of Martin's circulating this memorandum effectively ex-
cused Martin's actions, further lessened the impact of the 
discipline, and treated Martin, rather than Reinhold, as the vic-
tim. 174 "Stating that the March 27 memo was the 'last straw,' 
Reinhold gave notice of her resignation on March 30, 1992."175 
The jury awarded her $85,000 in damages to be paid by the 
school.176 In the first Reinhold appeal (Reinhold I), the Fourth Cir-
cuit applied the pre-Ellerth/Faragher standards. In the words of the 
Reinhold I court, "Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an 
employer conditions, explicitly or implicitly, the receipt of a job 
benefit or a tangible job detriment on the employee's acceptance 
. . f 1 d ,177 or reJection o sexua a vances. 
Applying this pre-Ellerth standard, the appellate court upheld the 
verdict for Reinhold on the quid pro quo claim.178 The court con-
cluded that the supervisor's assigning Reinhold extra work and 
inappropriate work assignments and denying her the opportunity 
to attend a professional conference constituted, in pre-Ellerth par-
lance, a "tangible job detriment" sufficient to support a claim of 
'd h 179 qut pro quo arassment. 
Mter the Supreme Court issued its decisions in Faragher and 
Ellerth, the panel granted petitions for rehearing to reconsider the 
171. ld. at 927. 
172. ld. at 927-28. 
173. ld. at 928. 
174. /d. 
175. /d. 
176. The jury returned a verdict for the employer on an additional claim for retaliation 
in violation of Title VII. Reinhold Il, 151 F.3d. at 173-74. 
177. Reinhold I, 135 F. 3d. at 931. 
178. ld. at 936. 
179. ld. at 933. The court rejected the plaintiff's verdict on the hostile environment 
claim, not because the environment was not hostile, but because the employer "could not be 
held liable for any hostile work environment created by [the supervisor) because as soon as 
[the employer] learned of the harassment, it took adequate remedial action that resulted in 
the cessation of the offensive conduct." Reinhold Il, 151 F.3d at 174 (discussing Fourth Cir-
cuit's first review of Reinhold J). 
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case in light of Ellerth/Faragher. 180 The same three judges181 con-
cluded that the plaintiff had not established a TEA and remanded 
to allow the defendant to assert the affirmative defenses. 182 The 
court did not explain why a plaintiff who had prevailed under a 
standard that rendered employers strictly liable on a finding that 
the plaintiff had suffered a "tangible job detriment," should fail 
under a standard that rendered employers strictly liable for har-
assment involving "TEA's."183 The Fourth Circuit court 
acknowledged "that any significant alteration could constitute a 
[TEA]," and it did not explain what it was about the changes in 
Reinhold's work assignment that rendered those changes insignifi-
cant.184 Apparently Reinhold found those changes so significant 
that she resigned her position because of them. The record, in 
fact, suggests that Martin's deliberate retaliation against Reinhold 
not only significantly altered her employment in its own right, but 
that the alteration was exacerbated by the school's complicity in 
holding Reinhold responsible for Martin's wrongdoing and refus-
ing to protect her from other employees' retaliatory harassment of 
her, all of which ultimately caused Reinhold to resign. 
The actions taken against Reinhold were tangible for purposes 
of the Supreme Court's definition. Martin acted in his official ca-
pacity through higher management in denying her request to 
attend the conference. The school acted officially in transferring 
her instead of him, in condoning the self-exculpatory memo and 
in denying her request for assistance to halt coworkers' retaliatory 
harassment of Reinhold.185 
180. Reinhold II, 151 F.3d at 173. 
181. One of the panel members wrote a dissent in Reinhold/. 135 F.3d at 936 (Niemeyer, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
182. Reinhold I, 135 F.3d at 175. 
183. In fact, the first Reinhold appellate decision expressly rejected the idea that quid 
pro quo cases should be restricted to ultimate employment actions, quoting from an earlier 
Fourth Circuit precedent: 
"[t]he supervisory employee need not have ultimate authority to hire or fire to qual-
ify as an employer, as long as he or she has significant input into such personnel 
decisions." ... [W]e stated that "[t]he power to determine work assignments often 
represents a key element of supervisory authority." 
Reinhold /, 135 F.3d at 934 (alterations in original) (quoting Paroline v. Unisys Corp. 879 
F.2d 100,104 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990)) . 
184. Reinhold II, 151 F.3d at 175. 
185. Commentators have disagreed over whether and when an employer's failure to 
remedy known co-worker harassment that is in retaliation for the employee's engaging in 
protected activities should give rise to employer liability under Title VII's retaliation provi-
sion, section 704, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Compare Kari Jahnke, Protecting Employees from 
Employees: Applying Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision to Co-Worker Harassment, 19 LAW & INEQ. 
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The Ellerth Court required that a line be drawn between TEA 
cases where power delegated by the employer to the supervisor en-
abled the employer to harass the plaintiff and non-TEA cases 
where the effect of the harassment, though done by a supervisor, 
was no different from what would have resulted from a co-worker's 
harassment. Pursuant to this requirement, the Fourth Circuit drew 
a line in Reinhold, but it drew it in the wrong place. Where the 
Fourth Circuit draws the line is consistent with the Ellerth rationale 
for cases in which the sole cause of the plaintiff's resigning her po-
sition is the unwelcome sexual advances. Advances by her co-
worker could have had the same result. However, where the super-
visor takes retaliatory action against the victim in ways that make 
use of the powers delegated by the employer, the resulting termi-
nation of employment should constitute a TEA after Ellerth just as 
it would have before Ellerth and in fact did in Reinhold I itself. 
Where, moreover, the employer's knowing failure 186 to protect the 
victim from retaliatory harassment for her complaint and the em-
ployer's complicity in the harasser's public relations effort to paint 
the victim, rather than himself, as the culprit ultimately cause the 
employee to resign her position, the Supreme Court's Ellerth ra-
tionale points clearly to treating the case as one of TEA. 
D. Recognizing TEAs Only in Quid Pro Quo Cases 
In the words of the Ellerth/Faragher Court, a supervisor's "envi-
ronmental harassment culminating in a [TEA]" imposes absolute 
liability on the employer. 187 This language encompasses a broad 
J. 101 (2001 ), with Olson, supra note 92. Reinhold's case also reflects problems of disaggre-
gation and elevation of form over substance. Disaggregation entails courts' looking at each 
in a series of harassing actions taken against a plaintiff in isolation, finding that no single 
fact amounted to an actionable TEA where, in combination, the actions do, in fact, amount 
to a TEA. Courts elevating form over substance have been hyper technical in requiring that 
the company act carry an official imprimatur of the employer, rather than recognizing that 
the employer's exclusion of the plaintiff from the workplace or other job detriment consti-
tutes a TEA, whether communicated on company letterhead or not. See Watts v. Kroger Co., 
170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999) (considering actions taken against plaintiff individually, 
rather than in aggregation, to determine that plaintiff has not suffered adverse employment 
action: "Simply changing one's work schedule is not a change in her employment status. 
Neither is expanding the duties of one's job as a member of the produce department to 
include mopping the floor, cleaning the chrome in the produce department, and requiring 
her to check with her supervisor before taking breaks.") . 
186. This failure alone should be enough to subject the employer to liability in its own 
right, without any need to impute the acts of the supervisor to the employer. 
187. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. 
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range of situations. 188 Although this would include traditional quid 
pro quo cases, there is nothing in the Court's language that would 
restrict the TEA characterization to such cases. Nevertheless, many 
courts have limited the absolute liability category to quid pro quo 
cases. 
189 These courts treat the TEA category as if the Ellerth Court 
had simply carved off a sub-set of what had previously been quid-
pro quo cases.190 Such lower courts treat the hostile environment as 
a separate claim from the TEA in which it culminates: The hostile 
environment claim is actionable if severe or pervasive and the TEA 
claim is treated like any other disparate treatment case. 
Although the Faragher opinion does not support this reading, 
the Ellerth opinion arguably does. Ellerth itself involved threats, so 
announced its conclusion in terms of threats: 
When a plaintiff proves that a TEA resulted from a refusal to 
submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes 
that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in 
the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable 
under Title VII. For any sexual harassment preceding the 
employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct 
must be severe or pervasive. Because Ellerth 's claim involves 
only unfulfilled threats, it should be categorized as a hostile 
work environment claim which requires a showing of severe 
. d 191 or pervasive con uct. 
The language of Ellerth, while including actuated quid pro quo 
cases in the absolute employer liability category does not necessar-
ily restrict the definition of TEA's to quid pro quo claims.192 
Moreover, the Faragher case, which did not involve quid pro quo 
threats, included no reference to such threats in its articulation of 
188. SeeLissae v. S. Food Svc., 159 F.3d 177, 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (Michaels,], dissenting) 
(TEA occurs whenever the action raken against the plaintiff is in any way related to the har-
assment). Thus, the boss who retaliates against a worker because the worker refuses the boss' 
sexual advance exposes the employer to the same liability as the boss who retaliates because 
the worker reports the boss' open and active hostility toward women in the workplace. In 
either event, the nexus between the harassment and the adverse action is established by 
proof of the harassment and the single actor. 
189. See, e.g., Fatjam v. N.Y. Health & Hosp. Corp., 96 Civ. 1231 (KMW) (RLE), 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3741 , *48 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 23, 2000). 
190. If the case does not involve sexual advances whose rejection motivates the supervi-
sor to take the TEA, the case is deemed environmental. 
191. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54. (citations omitted) 
192. The middle sentence in the above quotation (regarding actionability of the envi-
ronmental portion alone) may be read as clarification of the standard of proof for the 
environmental portion if pursued independently, rather than intended to exclude the envi-
ronmental portion of the claim from the absolute liability category. 
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the holding. As set forth in Faragher, the standard for absolute em-
ployer liability focuses simply on the harassment's culmination m 
TEA, without regard to the presence of sexual demands-
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized 
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a 
supervisor with imm~diate (or successively higher) authority 
over the employee. When no TEA is taken, a defending em-
ployer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, 
subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 193 
Arguably, then, Ellerth means to exclude non-actuated threats, but 
to include non-quid pro quo TEA harassment that did not involve 
threats to begin with. 
Courts lim~ting TEA to cases involving rejection of sexual de-
mands, view the situation as giving rise to two claims: One for the 
hostile environment, if it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to be 
actionable; and one for the TEA, which is treated as a traditional 
disparate treatment claim. One problem with breaking up the case 
in this manner is that the harassment preceding the TEA becomes 
mere evidence in the disparate treatment case, rather than a part 
of the TEA claim, even where the earlier harassment is inextricably 
a part of the process that resulted in the TEA.194 As an independent 
cause of action, the environmental claim is defeated by the affirma-
tive defense, on which, given current trends, it may be safe to 
assume the defendant will prevail. An analytic structure that rec-
ognizes TEA harassment only if sexual advances are involved 
excludes large numbers of serious harassment cases entirely from 
any Title VII protection. 
The case of Angel Watkins is illustrative.195 According to Watkins' 
evidence, her immediate supervisor, Kel~y, harassed her.196 The 
193. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 689. 
194. Treating such harassment claims in accordance with proof structures employed for 
straight disparate treatment claims poses its own problems. A successful environmental har-
assment case, preceding a TEA, creates a very persuasive case that the animus that caused 
the environmental harassment also caused the TEA regardless of whether the harassment 
was severe or persuasive. This is undoubtedly so where the same supervisor takes both ac-
tions, but even arguably so where more than one supervisor colludes against the plaintiff. 
Yet, courts' tendency to view all cases through the McDonnell Douglas prism, regardless of 
how direct the evidence, may cause such cases to get hung up on the shoals of requiring the 
plaintiff to prove the negative-that the defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was 
not the real or only reason, even where she has persuaded the trier of fact tha t the environ-
mental harassment occurred. 
195. Watkins v. Prof! Sec. Bureau, No. 98-2555, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841 (4th Cir. 
Nov. 15, 1999) cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1108 (2000); see also Zelaya v. Eastern & Western Hotel 
Corp., No. 99-16179, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3492, *2-3 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2001) (finding no 
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harassment included rape and fondling. 197 Watkins testified that 
she was required to attend a meeting with three supervisors, in-
cluding Kelly. 198 At that meeting, she informed the three that she 
had reported the harassment to the EEOC.199 In response, and in 
the presence of the other two supervisors, Kelly immediately ter-
. dWtki' l 200 mmate a ns emp oyment. 
Watkins sued under Title VII, alleging that her termination re-
sulted from her complaints of the sexual harassment.201 A jury 
reached a verdict for Watkins on her claims of harassment and re-
taliation.202 The trial court set the verdict aside, granting judgment 
as a matter of law for the employer, and the appellate court af-
firmed, finding no connection between the harassment and the 
. . 203 termmati.on. 
There are two problems with the appellate court's Watkins hold-
ing: One in the court's reading of the facts and the other in its 
reading of the Supreme Court's Ellerth/Faragher holding. With re-
spect to the facts of Watkins' case, the problem is that plaintiff's 
evidence (which the jury believed) showed that it was Kelly, the 
harasser, who made the decision to terminate Watkins.204 The trial 
and appellate courts' decision to reject this evidence constituted a 
clear-cut credibility determination. Courts may, of course, overrule 
jury findings of fact, but only when no reasonable jury could find 
the fact as found; the jury's credibility determinations are to be 
given great deference.205 
More importantly for present purposes, the appellate court's 
reading of the Ellerth/Faragher opinions ignores the Supreme 
Court's definition of TEA, which included situations in which a 
"hostile environment culminates in a [TEA]." Logically, more than 
T£A where supervisor threatened subordinate that, if she told her husband about advances, 
she would be fired and when she again threatened to tell husband, supervisor took her keys 
and told her to "go home" which apparently ended her term of employment). 
196. Watkins, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841, at *4. 
197. /d. 
198. /d. at *5. 
199. /d. at *6. 
200. /d. 
201. /d. at *7. 
202. !d. at *8. 
203. /d. at *1-2. 
204. According to Watkins' testimony, which the jury apparently believed, the harasser 
himself, Kelly, told Watkins that she was being terminated at the point in that meeting when 
Watkins stated that she had reported Kelly's acts to the EEOC. /d. at *6. The appellate court 
noted that "Nicola's account of the termination is diametrically opposed to Watkins' ac-
count," but arguably this inconsistency became irrelevant when the jury chose to believe 
Watkins. /d. at *6 n.6. 
205. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). 
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one supervisor can be responsible for creation of a hostile envi-
ronment that culminates in a TEA.206 Watkins met with all three of 
her supervisors, Fisher, Nicola, and Kelly.207 In the course the meet-
ing, the higher-ups allowed Kelly, the harasser, to terminate 
Watkins when she informed them of her complaint to the EEOC.208 
The harassment of plaintiff did culminate in the TEA, although 
her rejection of the harasser's sexual advances did not immediately 
precipitate the TEA. 
Jennifer Elmasry's case received similar treatment.209 Elmasry's 
immediate supervisor, Bill Veith, hired Elmasry in November of 
1997 and fired her four months later.210 In the interim, he sexually 
harassed Elmasry, touching and commenting upon her intimate 
body parts, hugging her, and offering her favors, including money 
and free meals.211 Elmasry "did not want to accept these favors but 
felt that she had to because Veith was her boss. She . .. believed 
that Veith wanted some sort of sexual relationship with her in re-
turn for the favorable treatment he gave her."212 She repeatedly told 
Veith that his attentions were unwelcome.213 There would have 
been little point in reporting the harassment to higher manage-
ment, because Veith's supervisor, Nar Handa, shared Veith's 
attitude.214 When Handa was about to visit the plant, Veith told 
206. Watkins, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841, at *13 ("Watkins herself acknowledges 
[there was no TEA] by arguing that she was terminated in retaliation for threatening to 
report Kelley's conduct to the police and the EEOC."). In fact, Watkins' evidence suggested 
that three supervisors were responsible for the creation of a hostile environment that in-
cluded the sexual assault incidents by one of the three. The evidence showed that one of the 
non-assaulting supervisors suggested to Watkins that she should be thanking the assaulting 
supervisor for her position because Watkins otherwise would have been terminated. /d. at 
*4. But see Louis DiLorenzo & Laura Harshbarger, Emplnyer Liability for Superois,. Harassment 
afterEIIerth and Faragher, 6 DuKE]. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 3, n . 107 (arguing that TEA must be 
imposed by the harasser). 
207. Watkins, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841 at *5-6. 
208. /d. at *6. 
209. Elmasry v. Veith, No. 98-696-JD, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 340 (D.N.H.Jan. 7, 2000). 
210. /d. at *3. 
211. /d. at *3-5. 
212. !d. at *5. Under company policy, Veith was the proper authority to receive El-
masry's reports of harassment. She repeatedly complained to Veith himself about his 
behavior, but to no avail. /d. at *22-23. 
213. /d. at *22. 
214. At Elmasry's deposition, the following colloquy took place: 
Q. And it was your conclusion that once you told Bill [Veith] you didn't 
like the way he was talking, and he continued to talk that way, that there 
was nothing else you could do? Is that what you-
A. There was no one else to tum to. Because I had already met [higher 
management] and .. . they were like him. 
/d. at *20. 
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Elmasry to "wear her hair down, a nice dress and high heeled 
shoes," and warned her that Handa "might try to take her away 
from Veith ... when he saw her breasts. "215 
Shortly before Veith fired Elmasry, he invited her out for her 
birthday and told her that he had "something special" for her.216 
Mraid of Veith, Elmasry complained to the police, who told her to 
stay home from work. 217 After Elmasry had stayed home for two 
days, Veith fired her for missing work.218 · 
Even though Elmasry's harasser fired her, the court granted 
summary judgment for the employer on the TEA issue, stating that 
"[i]fVeith [had] fired Elmasry because she refused to submit to his 
sexual demands, the firing would [have]constitute[d] a TEA."219 
Because the court found no TEA, it allowed the defendant to assert 
the affirmative defense.220 Yet, the harassment clearly culminated in a 
TEA. Admittedly, Elmasry's unexcused absence intervened as a 
cause, but the reason for her unexcused absence was the need to 
avoid the harasser and the unavailability of any other recourse. By 
constraining the TEA definition to include only quid pro quo har-
assment, the court excluded on a summary judgment motion what, 
if proved true, would have been a flagrant case of TEA harassment. 
E. Conjlation of Retaliation Doctrine and Harassment Doctrinl21 
Because harassment often involves retaliation, a single set of 
facts may create claims for both TEA harassment and section 704 
215. /d. 
216. /d. at *6. 
217. /d. at* 7. 
218. !d. at *7. 
219. /d. at*17. 
220. /d. at *26. In addition, because it found no TEA, the court required the plaintiff to 
show that the harassment was severe or pervasive. 
221. Section 704(a) of Title VII forbids employer retaliation for employee assertion of 
Title VII rights. Such assertions may consist of participation in administrative or judicial 
proceedings to enforce Title VII rights or less formal opposition to practices that (the em-
ployee reasonably believes) violate Title VII. The latter include employee protests directly to 
the discriminating supervisor. 
As long as Title VII forbids or appears to forbid the discrimination in question, Title VII 
prohibits retaliation, even though the employee actually invokes a legal ground other tha t 
Title VII itself. Thus if the employee invokes a state law protection that duplicates Title VII, 
Title VII prohibits retaliation. In addition, as explained below, the employee's reasonable 
belief that a violation has occurred is sufficient to create a right against retaliation even 
though ultimately there may prove to have been no violation. 
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retaliation.222 Consider, for example, a supervisor who asks a subor-
dinate to engage in sexual acts and fires the subordinate when she 
objects to those requests.223 This is clearly a case of TEA harass-
ment; it also qualifies as retaliation under section 704.224 Although 
many Title VII cases qualifY as both harassment and retaliation, 
litigants and courts have not systematically acknowledged that over-
lap or crafted any coherent process for choosing which doctrine (if 
not both) should apply to the facts of a given case. 
TEA analysis can be very different from retaliation analysis, so 
the court's decision about which type of analysis applies to a par-
ticular case may determine the outcome.225 The statutory basis for 
222. Because there are TEA's that do not constitute direct retaliation for rejection of a 
sexual advance or complaint about sexual harassment, there are TEA's that do not qualify 
for analysis under section 704. 
223. See Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., No. 99-6078, 2000 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 30772, *10 (11th Cir. Nov. 29, 2000) ("statutorily protected expression includes ... 
complaining to supervisors about sexual harassment") (citing Rollins v. State of Fla. Dep 't of 
Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989)). If the supervisor accompanies the 
request with a threat that the subordinate will be fired if she refuses, the case involves tradi-
tional quid pro quo harassment. As discussed above, non-quid pro quo TEA's are equally 
exempt from the Ellerth affirmative defenses. 
224. Examples of other situations in which both TEA harassment doctrine and section 
704 retaliation doctrine could apply are: 
1. A supervisor engages in severe or pervasive harassment of a subordinate 
employee because of the subordinate's sex. The subordinate complains, 
whether to the harassing supervisor or to higher management. The su-
pervisor fires the subordinate because of the complaint. 
2. As in the previous facts, a supervisor engages in severe or pervasive har-
assment of a subordinate employee because of the subordinate's sex, 
and the subordinate complains. 
3. The supervisor does not fire the subordinate when the latter complains, 
but-because of the complaint-refuses to protect the subordinate 
when other employees harass the subordinate, whether the latter har-
assment is in response to the complaint or in response to the victim's 
sex. This last set of facts poses the additional problem of whether and 
when employer's retaliatory actions do not consist of formal official 
personnel actions, retaliation may nevertheless be found. 
4. A supervisor refuses to give a subordinate a promotion because the 
subordinate is a woman. The subordinate complains to higher man-
agement or human resources. As a result of the complaint, the 
supervisor creates a hostile work environment for the subordinate. See 
Richardson v. Dept. of Corr., 180 F.3d 426, 443 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting 
"no disagreement that Richardson engaged in protected activity when 
she complained to supervisors about harassment"). 
225. The ramifications of such cross-pollination can be dispositive in the environmental 
context as well. Consider the case of a subordinate who reports the hostile environment to 
which a group of supervisors subjects her and who is harassed more as a result. Some circuits 
recognize section 704 retaliation claims for such retaliatory harassment (i.e., do not impose 
the heightened harm requirements discussed earlier in this ar ticle). See Wideman v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998)) (citing Wyatt v. City of Boston, 15-16 
(1st Cir. 1994); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984-86 (lOth Cir. 1996) ; Yartzoffv. 
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sexual harassment claims is section 703, which prohibits discrimi-
nation in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. The 
statutory basis for retaliation claims, section 704, prohibits em-
ployer retaliation for employees '226 opposition to any practice 
(including sexual harassment) prohibited by Title VII. 227 The pri-
mary reason why the choice between section 703 and section 704 
can be dispositive is that "mixed motive" analysis, which all circuits 
apply in appropriate section 703 cases, is unavailable in the section 
704 cases of some circuits.228 Mixed motive analysis allows plaintiffs 
to prevail (though with reduced remedies) by showing that, even 
though the defendant shows that other, non-discriminatory, rea-
sons were also at work.229 By the terms of Title VII, mixed-motive 
analysis is available in section 703 cases. 230 Because the statute is 
silent on the availability of mixed motive analysis in retaliation 
cases,
231 
some circuits have refused to apply mixed motive doctrine 
Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987)); Olson, supra note 92, at 258. If these circuits 
allow the section 704 claim, but import the Ellerth affirmative defense, the harassment will go 
unremedied. Because courts tend to presume that employers have made reasonable efforts 
to respond to harassment, the protections of section 704 will thereby have been weakened. 
226. In 1998, the Supreme Court held that the term, "employees," for purposes of sec-
tion 704, includes former employees. Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
227. In addition to protecting employees' informal opposition to discrimination, sec-
tion 704 protects their participation in processes available for challenging discrimination. In 
April of 2001, the Supreme Court considered a case in which the Ninth Circuit had applied 
the "reasonable belief" standard. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeder, 532 U.S. 268 (2001 ). In 
that case, the plaintiff had protested her supervisor's snickering in the plaintiff's presence 
\\ith a male co-worker about sexual references in a job application. /d. at 269. The Supreme 
Court found it unnecessary to resolve the split in the circuits on whether the plaintiff's rea-
sonable belief that the conduct violates Title VII. Id. at 270. Even assuming that was the 
standard, the Court stated, "[n] o reasonable person could have believed that the single 
incident recounted ... violated Title VII's standard." Id. at 271. Given the professed confu-
sion among the general public about what is and is not sexual harassment, this victim's 
conclusion that her supervisor's conduct violated the law is not so far fetched that the court 
should remove the decision from the jury as here happened in the grant of summary judg-
ment for the employer. Surely this is quintessentially a jury issue. See Deborah Zalesne, Sexual 
Harassment Law: Has it Gone too Far, or Has the Media? 8 TEMP. POL. & C1v. RTs. L.R. 351, 353 
(1999) (describing public confusion about what constitutes harassment). 
228. SeeTanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 684 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1119 
(1997) (rejecting mixed motive analysis for retaliation cases). 
229. Civil Rights Act ofl991, Pub. L. Nos. 102-166, Title I,§§ 105, 106, 107(a), 108, 105 
Stat. 1074-1076 (1991), codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (adding Title VII 
§ 703(m)). 
230. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
231. The availability of mixed motive analysis benefits plaintiffs by allowing victory even 
where discrimination is not the only reason. But it also helps defendants, by reducing reme-
dies when they show they would have reached the same decision against the plaintiff even in 
the absence of the discriminatory reason: 
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 
703(m) [42 uses§ 2000e-2(m)] and a respondent demonstrates that 
the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the 
impermissible motivating factor, the court-
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in those cases.232 In the latter group of circuits, even though the 
plaintiff proves that the defendant has retaliated, the defendant 
may prevail by demonstrating that nondiscriminatory factors were 
also at work in the decision against the plaintiff.233 
/d. 
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided 
in clause (ii)). and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be 
directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 
703(m) § 42USCS § 2000e-2(m)]; and 
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admis-
sion, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in 
subparagraph (A) 
232. A majority of the circuits have declined to recognize mixed motive analysis in sec-
tion 704 retaliation claims. The Seventh Circuit in McNutt v. Board of Trustees, for example, 
observed that Congress had explicitly addressed retaliation claims in other sections of the 
1991 Civil Rights Act, but not in the provision that authorized mixed-motive analysis. 141 
F.3d 706, 707-09 (7th Cir. 1998). Other circuits have agreed. See Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics 
Serv., 181 F.3d 544, 552 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 933-
35 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 684-85 
(1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1119 (1997); see also Lewis v. Young Men's Christian 
Ass'n, 208 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (Civil Rights Act does not apply to dual motive 
retaliation claim under ADEA); cf Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d 848, 852 
(8th Cir. 2000) (mixed-motive analysis unavailable in retaliation cases under the False 
Claims Act). But see DeLiano v. N.D. State Univ., 951 F. Supp. 168. 170 (D.N.D. 1997) (hold-
ing that Civil Rights Act provisions apply to mixed motive retaliation cases); Hall v. City of 
Brawley, 887 F. Supp. 1333, 1346 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (same). This is inconsistent with the posi-
tion taken by some Title VII experts, who argue that section 704 should be given a more pro-
plaintiff construction than section 703: 
Indeed, as some courts have noted, the statutory language of section 704, which con-
tains no reference to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment," may suggest a broader sweep for section 704 than for section 703. 
McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Essary & Friedman, supra 
note 87 at 140-41 ("The anti-retaliation provision, which is not limited to a specific defini-
tion, as is the substantive discrimination provision, may be construed more broadly . ... "); 
EEOC Guidance on Retaliation Claims, [Analyzing Retaliation Claims, 1998 Daily Lab Rep., 
(BNA) 100 d27 (May 20, 1998)] ("The retaliation provisions set no qualifiers on the term 
[']to discriminate,' and therefore prohibit any discrimination that is reasonably likely to 
deter protected activity. They do not restrict the actions that can be challenged to those that 
affect the terms and conditions of employment."); White, supra note 84, at 1164 n.234. 
233. SeeTanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680,684 (1st Cir. 1996) , cert. denied, 520 U.S. lll9 
( 1997) (rejecting mixed motive analysis for retaliation cases). The 1991 Civil Rights Act 
amendments to Title VII provide: 
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in 
employment practices. Except as otherwise provided in this title [ 42 USCS §§ 2000e 
et seq.]. an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, br national origin was a motivating factor 
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 
Pub. L. Nos. 102-166, Title I,§§ 107, 112, 113(b), 105 Stat. 1075, 1078, 1079. Although, os-
tensibly, the McDonnell Douglas framework fits the section 704 retaliation context, courts 
have used the McDonnell Douglas analysis in direct evidence cases in ways that eliminate the 
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The case that Elizabeth Smith filed against First Union Bank 
demonstrates other problems that occur where section 704 juris-
prudence intersects with TEA doctrine.2 !14 Smith essentially lost 
both her harassment claim and her retaliation claim. The harass-
ment claim failed in the sense that the court treated it as non-TEA, 
thus allowed the affirmative defense to go forward. 235 She lost on 
the retaliation claim because the appellate court disaggregated the 
facts comprising the retaliation with the result that there appeared 
to be no connection between the harassment and the adverse em-
ployment action underlying her retaliation claim. 
Smith's supervisor, Scoggins, "subjected Smith to a barrage of 
threats and gender-based insults."236 In addition to general and of-
ten obscene derogation of women's professional abilities, Scoggins 
threatened Smith with physical violence.237 Smith did not initially 
complain because Scoggins told her that "she would lose her job if 
she complained about his conduct," and Scoggins' superior also 
warned Smith that "she should never complain to human re-
sources. "
238 Smith endured the harassment for more than a year, 
until she became fearful that Scoggins would carry out his threats 
of physical violence, at which time she registered a complaint with 
Marc Hutto, the Bank's human resources representative.239 She 
possibility that plaintiffs can win mixed-motive cases. See Cleary v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
No. 00-1461, 2001 U.S. App. 11318, *11-14 (4th Cir. May 31, 2001) (requiring plaintiff to 
show that defendant's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason pretextual even if 
plaintiff has proved causal connection between plaintiff' protected act and adverse action 
taken by plaintiff). But see Marquez v. Baker Process, Inc., No. 014019, 2002 U.S. App. 
LEXJS 13288, *6--13 (lOth Cir.July 2, 2002) (applying McDonnell Douglas to direct evidence 
retaliation case and reversing summary judgment for employer). This, operating in tandem 
with other courts' express denial of mixed motive analysis in retaliation cases, has sharply 
curtailed the protections afforded by section 704. 
234. Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2000). 
235. Id. at 246--47. Smith obtained a technical victory on appeal in that the appellate 
court found that there was a genuine issue of fact on whether the bank had provt:d both 
elements of the affirmative defense. Id. She lost, however, in that the case received treatment 
as a non-TEA case to begin with. 
236. Id. at 238. Among his harassing comments were that Scoggins wished he were a 
woman so that he could "whore his way through life" and that the "only way for a woman to 
get ahead at First Union is to spread her legs." Id. at 243 n.6. 
237. Scoggins stood over Smith's cubicle and barked orders at her and often concluded 
his orders to her with the remark, "or else you' ll see what will happen to you." /d. at 239. He 
also threatened her when he called her at home at I 0:00 p .m., accusing her of conspiring 
with his supervisor, George Andrews, to "get him." !d. at 239. "Scoggins made what a jury 
co uld find was a thinly veiled threat to kill Smith because of her gender in a way that made 
Smith feel that he was serious about harming her, especially in light of Scoggins' boasting 
about 'taking people out' while he was in the military." !d. at 243. 
238. /d. at 245. 
239. Id. at 240. 
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asked to be reassigned immediately to a workstation out of the vi-
cinity of Scoggin's workstation.~40 
First Union did not investigate Smith's sexual harassment allega-
tions, but suspended both Scoggins and Smith with pay and 
referred both to the company's Employee Assistance Program 
(EAP). When Smith informed the EAP counselor, Michael Price, of 
Scoggins' harassment, Price advised her not to return to a work site 
near Scoggins.241 First Union then agreed to transfer Smith to a dif-
ferent team, but the new team was only 100 feet from Scoggins' 
team.242 Smith consulted a therapist, who told her that she suffered 
from "an adjustment disorder caused, at least in part, by Scoggins' 
harassing conduct. "243 The therapist advised her not to work in 
Scoggins' vicinity.244 When Smith informed Hutto of this advice, 
Hutto became annoyed and warned her that she would be termi-
nated if she did not submit her disability papers within fifteen 
days.245 Hutto subsequently advised Smith that she would be per-
mitted to come back to work to a position away from Scoggins only 
if she first returned to her former position in Scoggins' area.246 
Smith declined to follow Hutto's instructions.247 Ostensibly, the 
bank relented, allowing Smith to apply for other jobs at First Un-
ion without first returning to work in Scoggins' area.248 Although 
she applied for seventy-five openings, however, she received no of-
fers.249 She remained on disability leave until July 1995, when the 
bank fired her.250 
The federal district court granted the bank's motion for sum-
mary judgment on all counts.251 The Fourth Circuit reversed the 
trial court on the question of whether Scoggins' behavior created 
an actionable hostile environment.252 Clearly, the Fourth Circuit 
said, it did.253 On the question of whether the Bank should be held 
240. /d. at 239. 
241. /d. at 240. 
242. /d. 
243. /d. 
244. /d. 
245. /d. 
246. /d. 
247. /d. 
248. /d. 
249. /d. at 234. 
250. /d. 
251. !d. at 241. 
252. Id at 246-47. 
253. /d. at 241-44. Scoggin's treatment of Smith was: (1) because of her sex; (2) unwel· 
come; and (3) severe or pervasive. /d. The trial court had concluded, as to (l) that Scoggins 
was abusive toward members of both sexes, thus not motivated by Smith's sex. The appellate 
court concluded that the harasser's disparaging references to plaintiff's sex made it clear 
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vicariously liable for the harassment, however, the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed summary judgment for the employer.254 The Fourth Cir-
cuit allowed the defendant to invoke the Ellerth/Faragher defense 
because "Smith ha[d] not allege[d] that she suffered a tangible 
employment action due to Scoggin's harassment."255 Excluding the 
TEA issue meant that the plaintiff's only hope for recovery lay in 
the retaliation claim. 
On the retaliation claim, however, the appellate court also af-
firmed summary judgment for the defendant. 256 Smith's retaliation 
claim was that First Union retaliated against her because she com-
plained about Scoggins' harassment of her.257 The Fourth Circuit 
disaggregated the facts underlying the retaliation claim: ( 1) it rec-
ognized that Hutto harbored an animus toward Smith that might 
have contributed to her ultimate termination; (2) it recognized 
that Hutto's animus toward Smith resulted directly from her dis-
ability claim; (3) it recognized that the disability claim resulted 
directly from the harassment and First Union's refusal to reassign 
Smith away from the harasser. 258 Yet, the court refused to draw the 
necessary conclusion that the harassment thus culminated in 
Smith's termination. If the court had indeed followed its own edict: 
to view the facts at the summary judgment stage in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, it would have left to the jury to 
decide the question of whether the harassment culminated in the 
termination, rather than granting summary judgment for the de-
fendant. 
The fact that Smith did indeed offer sufficient proof to avoid 
summary judgment on the retaliation question necessarily means 
that she should have prevailed on the TEA issue and thus avoided 
any need even to consider the affirmative defense. The employer 
in this case took action against Smith (firing her) in retaliation for 
her submitting a disability claim, which claim she submitted be-
that Scoggins was motivated by Smith's sex. On the requirement of severity or pervasiveness, 
the uial court had found for the employer because "[P]Iaintiff has not claimed that 
Scoggins ever inappropriately touched, propositioned or ogled her, that Scoggins ever in-
vited her, explicitly or by implication, to have sex with him or to go out on a date with him." 
Id. at 242. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, explaining that the district court "failed to recog-
nize that a woman's work environment can be hostile even if she is not subjected to sexual 
advances or propositions." Id. (citations omitted). 
254. Id. at 244. 
255. Jd. at 244. According to the appellate court, the parties had fully briefed the 
Ellerlh/Faragher issues, so the failure the plaintiff's failure to raise the tangible employment 
action possibility may have constituted a waiver of the issue. 
256. Jd. at 249. 
257. Jd. at 241. 
258. ld. at 249. 
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cause the employer refused to offer a non-hostile environment in 
which to work. 
The intersection between retaliation doctrine and TEA harass-
ment doctrine thus resembles a minefield for plaintiffs with even 
the most meritorious claims. It is uncertain whether the Smith 
court would have required a closer causal nexus for retaliation 
than for harassment culminating in a TEA. What is clear is that the 
court's decision not to consider the TEA possibility left the plaintiff 
with only a retaliation claim, which the court disaggregated into 
separate factual units to avoid finding a causal nexus. Once the 
facts were disconnected, the court then declined to apply mixed 
motive analysis, so that the permissible motive (the disability claim) 
sufficed to exonerate the defendant completely. 
CoNCLUSION 
In sexual harassment litigation, the decision whether to charac-
terize a supervisor's harassment as TEA often decides the outcome 
of the case. If the supervisor's action is deemed a TEA, the plaintiff 
has a possibility of prevailing in imposing liability on the employer. 
If the supervisor's action is not deemed a TEA, the employer's abil-
ity to invoke the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense is likely to 
result in the employer's immunity from liability for Title VII viola-
tions. Despite the importance of how the supervisor's act is 
characterized, courts have employed several analytical methods 
that have weighted the process very heavily against the TEA charac-
terization. These methodologies evince intrinsic flaws that warrant 
careful rethinking by the courts, for their current use effectively 
thwarts the promise of Title VII. 
